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Cryptography and security protocols are today commonly used to protect data at-
rest and in-transit. In contrast, protecting data in-use has seen only limited adop-
tion. Secure data transfer methods employed today rarely provide guarantees re-
garding the trustworthiness of the software and hardware at the communication
endpoints.
The field of study that addresses these issues is called Trusted or Confidential Com-
puting and relies on the use of hardware-based techniques. These techniques aim
to isolate critical data and its processing from the rest of the system. More specif-
ically, it investigates the use of hardware isolated Secure Execution Environments
(SEEs) where applications cannot be tampered with during operation. Over the past
few decades, several implementations of SEEs have been introduced, each based on
a different hardware architecture. However, lately, the trend is to move towards
architecture-independent SEEs.
As part of this, Huawei research project is developing a secure enclave framework
that enables secure execution and migration of applications (mobile agents), regard-
less of the underlying architecture. This thesis contributes to the development of the
framework by participating in the design and implementation of a secure migration
scheme for the mobile agents. The goal is a scheme wherein it is possible to transfer
the mobile agent without compromising the security guarantees provided by SEEs.
Further, the thesis also provides performance measurements of the migration scheme
implemented in a proof of concept of the framework.
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In the last decades, digitalization has had a huge effect on industries and us as
individuals. Industries have been able to cut costs, increase their efficiency and
productivity, and cope with the growing demand by digitalizing their services. At the
same time, we as individuals have been offered better products that have increased
the comfort of our daily life. Among all the different digital facilities offered to
us, mobile devices are the ones that have the most influence on our lives. Their
constant connectivity and mobility allow users to access the desired services at any
time from everywhere and sometimes are even strictly required to access certain
products. For instance, smartphones not only are connecting people all over the
world but they are becoming essential due to the different services they can offer,
such as handling banking accounts, payments, tickets, digital identities, etc. In
addition to smartphones, also IoT devices are able to add value to individuals and
industries. In fact, they can be employed in a great range of applications, from
monitoring production processes and infrastructures to augmenting the comfort of
our homes.
Despite the performance enhancements that mobile devices and IoT have expe-
rienced, their resources are still limited and cannot always satisfy the computational
intensive applications that the end-user may need to use. Hence, computation of-
floading techniques such as Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) started to be used as
a mean to overcome the various limitations imposed by restricted processing capa-
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
bilities, battery lifetime, and storage capacity [1]. Furthermore, to have an even
better user experience, new technologies like Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) have
been standardized [2]. These are addressing the latency issues of traditional Cloud
Computing (CC) techniques by moving the computational capabilities to the edge
of the network. As in Cloud Computing, MEC is based on virtualized platforms
able to allocate physical resources that will be used to accomplish the tasks required
by IoT and mobile devices. The hosting platforms are able to support both, (i)
virtualization technologies, such as virtual machines (VMs) and containers, and (ii)
execution environments, like the ones required by mobile agents. According to Guo
et al. [3], among these technologies, mobile agents seem to be more suitable for
IoT and MEC/MCC due to their smaller size and higher flexibility in heterogeneous
environments, since they only need a runtime environment to be executed. A mobile
agent is interpreted code that can migrate between different hosts, together with its
state, to perform specific tasks. One such example is the JAVA Agent Development
Framework (JADE) [4] based on the Java runtime environment, or the newly intro-
duced WebAssembly runtime that is able to ensure good security guarantees and
platform independence.
Mobile devices and IoT together with the MEC and MCC technologies, provide
us with many facilities and services but at the expense of our privacy. That is
because they need to collect and process huge amounts of data about our activities
or our persona, such as sensitive data, and personal information. To address this
issue, multiple cryptographic algorithms and protocols are used. These can protect
the data at rest (e.g. with AES-XTS based full-disk encryption [5]) and in transit
(e.g. the TLS protocol [6]) but not the data in use. Indeed, when the data needs to
be processed by the device or offloaded on the cloud, it is still required to be in clear
to allow the accomplishment of the task. This can raise major risks for the sensitive
data in use unless there are guarantees in place ensuring that the integrity of the
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code or the data itself is not compromised. This goes hand in hand with the words
of Gene Spafford "Using encryption on the Internet is the equivalent of arranging an
armored car to deliver credit card information from someone living in a cardboard
box to someone living on a park bench" [7], meaning that just the secure transfer
of data does not provide any guarantee on the endpoint’s trustworthiness. Thus,
the actual behavior and execution of the task may be different from the expected
one. In the past years, the number of attacks and compromised endpoints on the
Internet has significantly increased [8]. In addition to this, especially due to the
COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, threats like phishing, ransomware, and malware
in general, reached a peak, when measured in the number of attacks [9], raising even
more concerns about compromised endpoints.
The issues regarding endpoint trustworthiness and confidentiality of the data
in use, may negatively impact the privacy of our data or the secrets processed on
our mobile devices and on the cloud. For instance, a compromised platform may
allow the disclosure of secret data to third parties at processing time or a mali-
cious endpoint may steal all the information provided to perform the required task.
These issues are even more relevant when offloading techniques are employed be-
cause ensuring the trustworthiness of remote hosting platforms is a non-trivial task.
For these reasons, to fully safeguard sensitive data and secrets from unauthorized
third parties and the user itself, the data needs to be protected not only at rest
and in transit but also when it is in use. The problem of securing the data in use
and providing trustworthiness guarantees about remote endpoints is addressed by
a field of study called Trusted or Confidential Computing. Trusted Computing is
grounded on the use of hardware-based techniques to isolate critical data and its
processing from the rest of the system. The confinement of the trusted code, the
one processing sensitive information, from the untrusted one, can be done through
many approaches supported by the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). These consist
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of cryptographic functions and memory isolation techniques that can guarantee the
confidentiality and integrity of the data during the execution of the code. This par-
ticular kind of execution context is known as Secure Execution Environment (SEE)
and is a place where applications cannot be tampered with while operating. In the
last decades, diverse implementations of SEEs have been introduced, each one based
on a different hardware architecture, which brings its own strengths and weaknesses.
All the various solutions can be classified into three main categories:
i External security co-processors, like Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
and removable secure elements.
ii Embedded security co-processors, such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
[10], secure elements, Google’s Titan M Chip [11], and Apples’s Security Enclave
Processor [12].
iii Processor secure environments (PSEs), like ARM TrustZone [13], Intel SGX
[14], AMD Secure Encryption Virtualization (SEV) [15], and ARM Confidential
Compute Architecture (CCA) [16].
Regardless of the fact that the first two categories of SEEs can provide a higher
degree of isolation thanks to their physical separation from the main processor,
they are not suitable for a large number of applications. That is because they are
either too cumbersome or their overall performance is too restricted. In contrast,
PSEs are implemented on the main processor, guaranteeing higher performance and
much more flexibility. Even though PSEs are nowadays employed in a wide range
of applications, they are still highly bound to the hardware architecture underlying
the SEE. And so, it does not get along with the high degree of heterogeneity in
mobile devices, IoT, and cloud computing. For this reason, lately, the trend is
to move towards architecture independent SEEs, which may suit better MCC and
MEC technologies and allow the development of new innovative applications. An
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example of this trend is Twine, an Embedded Trusted Runtime for WebAssembly
[17]. Due to its implementation upon a WebAssembly-based architecture, it is able to
abstract the application from the underlying SEE hardware and run the application
in an isolated sandbox provided by the WebAssembly Interpreter (WASI). Into the
architecture, a malicious application is prevented from escaping the sandbox, i.e.
accessing data without authorization, and the application itself is protected from
the untrusted code by the SEE isolation. Furthermore, the abstraction layer in
Twine, allows developers to write their applications in any programming language
that can be compiled to WebAssembly and execute them on diverse SEEs regardless
of the underlying hardware architecture [17].
1.1 Project Overview
Although there is a growing trend to increase the interoperability of software among
different SEEs and solutions like Twine already exist, the possibility to securely mi-
grate mobile agents between Secure Execution Environments on different hardware
architectures is still missing.
In order to fulfill these needs, a research project at Huawei Technologies Oy
Helsinki Research Center is developing a framework that enables the execution and
migration of mobile agents between secure enclaves (a special case of SEEs, see
Section 2.3.4) independently from the hardware architecture backing the SEEs. In
order to clearly frame the goals of the project, these will be listed below:
• provide an architecture able to run mobile agents within a secure enclave,
independently of the hardware architecture;
• ensure that mobile agents are isolated from the platform in such a way that
they cannot harm the platform itself;
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• provide a secure migration mechanism between two platforms that allow mo-
bile agents executing within a secure enclave to be safely relocated;
• ensure that the migration process does not downgrade the protection of mobile
agents by employing trusted channels to establish trustworthiness between the
endpoints.
The project was developed in a team at Huawei, and from this work two other
papers were produced in parallel:
• "Trusted Sockets Layer: a TLS 1.3 based trusted channel protocol" [18]
Authors:
– Arto Niemi
– Vasile Adrian Bogdan Pop
– Jan-Erik Ekberg
• "Towards Secure Mobile Agents" [19]
Authors:





Thereby, the aim of this project is to improve the security and interoperability
of applications inside IoT and mobile devices, and to ease the adoption of these
solutions in the cloud computing services. Which, is in line with the main objective
of the Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC) [20], a project community at the
Linux Foundation.
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1.1.1 Personal Contributions
As for my contribution, I participated in the project by working alongside the team.
Moreover, my personal contributions can be presented by grouping them into five
main endeavors:
• taking an existing size-optimized TLS library and implementing the trusted
channel protocol as described in the first paper produced;
• participating in the design of the migration scheme described in the second
paper and this thesis;
• adding a secure local communication between the SEE and untrusted envi-
ronment to support the establishment of a trusted channel among SEEs on
different devices;
• implementing a PoC in which the migration scheme is followed and work-
ing alongside the Huawei team contributing to the components of the secure
enclave framework;
• measuring the performance of the resulting secure migration scheme.
Differently from the two papers, where either the trusted channel or the whole
secure enclave framework are addressed, this thesis has a narrower focus on the
design and implementation of the secure migration scheme.
In the following sections of the Thesis, firstly the basics of information security
and cryptography will be discussed. And together with these, a brief explanation
of hardware-based security and secure transfer protocols will be provided. Then,
an overview of the current state of the art of secure execution environments and
mobile agents will be presented. After the context-relevant information, the Thesis
will continue by specifying the architecture of the secure enclave framework and the
design of the migration scheme. Finally, it will conclude with the description of the
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PoC implementation and the benchmarks related to the secure migration of mobile
agents.
2 Background
In this chapter, the basics of information security and cryptography will be illus-
trated with a focus on the topics required to comprehend the design and the imple-
mentation of secure enclaves in the thesis. The chapter will start with the principal
objectives of information security and the cryptographic primitives employed to en-
sure them. Next, the necessary terminology and protocols for the comprehension of
Secure Execution Environments and migration mechanisms will be described. The
chapter will conclude with the programming languages used to develop the frame-
work and the migration process of the thesis and the benefits they bring.
2.1 Information Security Objectives
The terms confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also known as the CIA
triad, have been largely used as the fundamental elements of security controls in in-
formation systems [21] in both practice and academic literature. However, in recent
years many attempts were made to extend the scope of the CIA triad by introduc-
ing additionals terms like authenticity, non-repudiation, and trust. They were
minted to address the new emerging issues of information security [21].
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality has its root grounded in the military mindset of maintaining a top-
down authority and control over those that have access to information, on a need-
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to-know basis [21]. Meaning that the information available at higher authorization
levels had to be protected against its disclosure to lower authorization levels. And
so, it can be defined as follows: "Confidentiality is the prevention of the disclosure of
secret or sensitive information to unauthorized users or entities" [22]. Confidential-
ity of code and data can be accomplished when there is no action, or set of actions,
that an untrusted entity can make to directly read, or otherwise deduce, contents
of the confidential code or data [23].
2.1.2 Integrity
Integrity can be defined as "the prevention of unauthorized modification of protected
information without detection" [22]. The integrity of code and data can be ensured
if there is no action, or set of actions, which allow an untrusted entity to modify the
protected code or data without detection [23]. An example of an attack threatening
the integrity of the information is the Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM) where a
malicious party is interposed between the communication of two legitimate entities
and, in addition to eavesdropping on the communication, alters the information.
2.1.3 Availability
"Availability is the provision of services and systems to legitimate users when re-
quested or needed" [22]. This means, that the availability of the code and data can
be ensured if there is no way for an attacker to deny service to the users of the sys-
tem [23]. For instance, the goal of a Denial of Service attack (DoS) is to compromise
the availability of a service by different means, from saturating the bandwidth of
the server, and so, the communication channel, to crashing the server itself.
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2.1.4 Authenticity
Providing authenticity "is of great importance to ensure the genuineness of physical
or electronic documents, communications, transactions, and data" [24]. This objec-
tive can be reached by proving that the entities involved in a communication are
who they claim to be. Authenticity is strictly related to integrity, insomuch that the
US Code [25] includes the concept of authenticity in the definition of integrity due
to their strong relationship. For instance, guaranteeing the authenticity of data that
was illegitimately modified does not bring any benefit since the information differs
from the original one, thus it may be useless or even harmful for the system.
2.1.5 Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is "the implication that one party in a transaction is not allowed to
deny having received a transaction, nor, conversely, is the other party permitted to
deny having sent the transaction" [24]. The last-mentioned property is fundamental
for example in financial transactions, where the occurrence of a payment already
happened should not be possible to deny. Non-repudiation is strictly related to
integrity too, a payment should not only be infeasible to deny but should also be
infeasible to modify once it took place.
2.1.6 Trust & trustworthiness
Although there is a subtle difference between trust and trustworthy, they cannot
be considered as interchangeable terms in information security because it will lead
to major security issues otherwise. The term "trust" was introduced to express
the need for privacy and reliability in information security."Trust is a choice one
makes about another system" [26], meaning that, since "trust" is a choice, there is
no explicit proof that the trusted component will behave in the way it should, but
we want to trust that it will do it anyway.
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 12
Trustworthy, on the other hand, is not only a choice but is the quality of an
entity to be trusted and to give some assurance that the trust will not be betrayed.
The guarantee can be given through some explicit proof stating the quality of an
entity to be trustworthy, and thus, it can be used in the decision process of trusting
the entity or not.
2.2 Cryptographic background
In the previous section, some of the objectives of information security were exposed
but without any details on how to safeguard them. Cryptography provides us the
means and defines the best known approach to ensure those objectives. According
to Kerckhoffs’s principle "A cryptographic system should be secure even if every-
thing about the system, except the key, is public knowledge" [27]. In other words,
a cryptosystem complies with Kerckhoff’s principle when its security depends on
the confidentiality of the key, but not on the confidentiality of the system itself.
This last approach aims at avoiding the so-called security through obscurity, where
the cryptosystem is secret and its disclosure can compromise every key ever used,
nullifying any security protection ensured by the cryptosystem.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic primitives are a set of low-level algorithms that are used as building
blocks to construct cryptographic protocols. Each of the various primitives is en-
suring one or more specific objectives of the CIA triad and together with protocols
and certificates, they are used to enforce the security of information systems.
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2.2.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric Key Cryptography is used to provide confidentiality of the data through
encryption. As can be deduced from the name, encryption and decryption are sym-
metric in the sense that the same key is used for both. The encryption mechanism
can be defined as a function Enc that has as an input two elements, the plaintext
p and the cryptographic key k, and has as an output the ciphertext c. Thus, the
encryption process is equal to: Enc(p, k) = c; while the decryption process is the
reverse: Dec(c, k) = p.
Ciphers are algorithms implementing the encryption and decryption of messages
deterministically and can be mainly categorized into Stream Ciphers and Block Ci-
phers. These can be distinguished by looking at the procedure used by the algo-
rithms to process the encryption/decryption. However, the procedures used in the
two categories may also be combined. For instance, AES-GCM is a mode of op-
eration that converts the AES block cipher into an authenticated encryption (AE)
stream cipher [28]. Ciphers providing authenticated encryption are a key concept
in modern cryptography, and they can ensure not only the confidentiality but also
the authenticity of a message. The authenticity is provided by the inclusion of the
Message Authentication Code (MAC) (Section 2.2.1.4) in the encryption. This can
be done with three different approaches, encrypt-then-MAC, encrypt-and-MAC, and
MAC-than-encrypt. Among the three different possibilities, the encrypt-than-MAC
is the one that provides the highest level of security due to its ability to ensure the
integrity for both the ciphertext and the plaintext [29].
Stream ciphers take as an input two streams of information, the plaintext, and
the pseudorandom keystream, and execute a bitwise XOR operation to generate the
ciphertext as an output. The keystream is generated by a pseudorandom number
generator, that takes a seed (e.g the key k) known by both parties and produces a
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deterministic stream of pseudorandom numbers. The randomness of the keystreams
is crucial for the ciphers because they are the elements that determine the random-
ness of the resulting ciphertexts, thus, the ones that play a key role in avoiding
any possible pattern that may leak some information on the encrypted data. Even
though it is obsolete and labeled as vulnerable, the most known implementation of
stream ciphers is RC4 [30]. Despite this, Salsa20 [31] and ChaCha [32] are the
most used ciphers nowadays since they are still considered to be secure.
Block ciphers on the other hand, instead of using streams of information, are
working on blocks of data. Depending on the specific algorithm used, they split the
plaintext into fixed-size blocks (e.g. AES uses 128 bit as a block size), which are then
encrypted one by one or in parallel. The method used to encrypt the data-blocks
depends on the mode of operation used. The latter defines how the block cipher
algorithm is repeatedly applied to all the data blocks forming the plaintext.
There exist various modes of operation, each one with specific advantages and
disadvantages. The simplest one is the Electronic Code Book (ECB) [33], where
each block of data is encrypted independently with the same key. In this way, the
encryption and decryption processes can be faster thanks to parallelization. How-
ever, this mode is very weak from a security point of view because a plaintext block
will be always mapped to the same ciphertext. Meaning that the encrypted data
will leak existing patterns in the plaintext. A more secure mode of operation is
the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [33]. Here, before the encryption, each plaintext
block is XORed with the previously encrypted block. This operation solves the pat-
tern leaking problem but makes parallelization infeasible, slowing down the overall
performance of the cipher. The Galois/Counter Mode of operation (GCM) [28] is
similar to the Counter Mode (CTR) [33] and tries to solve both the problems in
the previous modes of operation. This is possible thanks to the usage of a counter,
which is encrypted with a block cipher and then XORed with the plaintext. One
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of the characteristics of the GCM is that in addition to the ciphertext, it provides
also authentication on the encrypted messages through a particular mechanism of
hashing, chaining, and encrypting the resulting ciphertext [28]. This mechanism
provides the so-called authenticated encryption described in the above "Ciphers"
paragraph (Section 2.2.1.1).
The most popular block cipher algorithm is the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) also know with its original name Rijndael [34] after its inventors. The algo-
rithm selected for AES was decided in 2001 by NIST but among the various partici-
pants the SERPENT [35] cipher was the best one from a security point of view [36].
The reason why the Rijndael algorithm was selected to be standardized is due to
its better performance in terms of speed even if it was weaker than SERPENT [36].
Twenty years after its standardization, AES is still the most used algorithm and
deemed secure in practice. However, some attacks do exist. For instance, with the
biclique cryptanalysis attack [37] it is possible to reduce the computational complex-
ity required to recover the key. Another example is the use of quantum computing,
which is able to break the 128-bit version of the cipher [38]. Despite this, AES with
256-bits is still assumed to be resistant to quantum computing attacks.
The just mentioned block ciphers are mostly used when the systems are not
resource-restricted because they require heavy computational operations to be exe-
cuted. As a consequence, when the resources are limited, e.g. on mobile and IoT
devices, other "lightweight" block ciphers, such as PRESENT [39], are sometimes
employed.
2.2.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
The Asymmetric Key Cryptography, called also Public-Key Cryptography, can be
used to provide, (i) confidentiality by encrypting the message, (ii) integrity by sign-
ing it (Section 2.2.1.5), and/or a symmetric key via a key agreement protocol. In
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contrast to symmetric key cryptography, where just one key is enough to establish
a secure communication channel, asymmetric key cryptography requires both the
parties to have a pair of keys, the Secret key sk (also called Private key) and
the Public key pk. The pair of keys are mathematically related, such that the
public key can be easily derived from the private key, but not the other way around.
This means that it should be computationally infeasible to find out the value of the
private key sk given the corresponding public key pk. The final property is funda-
mental for public-key cryptography because to make it functional, the pk needs to
be distributed to all the participants in the communication system. For instance,
the distribution can take place through public-key certificates, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. In contrast, the secret key must be known only by the entity owning the
pair of keys, otherwise, the keys are compromised. The encryption process is similar
to the one used in symmetric cryptography, the difference lays in the keys used to
perform the encryption and decryption operations. When encrypting a message, the
sender needs to use the public key of the receiver: Enc(p, pkreceiver); meanwhile, the
receiver needs to use its secret key to decrypt the message: Dec(p, skreceiver).
Public-key cryptography is extremely important especially in untrusted environ-
ments like the Internet. It gives the possibility to the holders of the recipient’s
public key to establish a secure communication channel over the network without
the need of exchanging the symmetric key on an already established secure chan-
nel. Although it is possible to use just public-key cryptography to communicate
over a secure channel e.g. with RSA-DOAEP [40], its performance is relatively
slower than symmetric key cryptography. Thus, it is usually used only to exchange
a key for symmetric encryption, which, will be used for further communication. The
last-mentioned process can be called Key Exchange or Key Encapsulation Mecha-
nism based on the algorithm used for retrieving the symmetric key. For instance,
Diffie-Hellman (DH) [41] is the first publicly known key exchange algorithm and it
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is widely used in the authenticated key exchange (AKE) mechanism especially in its
version based on elliptic curves (ECDH) [42].
The most known and used algorithm in public-key cryptography is the RSA [43]
algorithm, whose security is based on the factorization of two large prime numbers
and the RSA problem [43]. The latter are mathematical problems for which there
are no algorithms running on traditional systems that can efficiently solve them, so it
is considered infeasible to retrieve the secret key from the public key. However, with
the advances in quantum computing and more optimized algorithms, the difficulty
to factorize a 2048 bit RSA integer has dropped significantly in 2021 [44]. Nowa-
days, quantum computers are threatening the security of all the algorithms that are
basing their security on discrete logarithm, elliptic curve discrete logarithm, and
factorization problems. To address this imminent problem, the NIST is already
working on the standardization of a Post-Quantum Cryptography [45], which will be
based on mathematical problems that are not vulnerable to quantum computing.
2.2.1.3 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions are cryptographic primitives capable of guaranteeing the integrity
of the information on which they are applied. A hash function can be seen as a
cumputationally efficient function Hash that takes as an input a string of data of
aribitrary length m, and maps it to a fixed length string called hash h: Hash(m) = h.
A secure hash function is one-way i.e. should not be possible to reconstruct the
original string from the hash string. Moreover, a cryptographic hash function should
have also the following properties [23]:
• Preimage resistance: given a hash value h should be computationally in-
feasible to find any string m such taht h = Hash(m)
• Second preimage resistance: given a specific string m1 it should be com-
putationally infeasible to find a different string m2 such that Hash(m1) =
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Hash(m2)
• Collision resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find two
random strings m1 and m2, where m1 ̸= m2 such that Hash(m1) = Hash(m2)
What makes hash functions ideal for checking the integrity of the data, is their ability
to map two very similar strings to two completely different hash values that can be
easily stored thanks to their small and fixed size. Among the various algorithms
implementing a hash function, the most used nowadays is the SHA-2 hash function
even though recently the SHA-3 (KECCAK) [46] hash function was standardized.
The SHA-2 is not superseded by SHA-3 even if there exist preimage attacks on
reduced versions of the algorithm [47][48]. That is because the full version of the
SHA-2 is not vulnerable but it may be in the future. The SHA-3 instead, should be
unaffected by the security flaws present in the previous SHA algorithms thanks to
a different internal design. And this is explainable by the fact the SHA-3 is based
on permutations [46], while the SHA-2 is based [49] on an underlying block cipher
and the Merkle-Damgård construction method [50].
2.2.1.4 Message Authentication Code
MACs are similar to hash functions but they not only ensure the integrity of the
string of data but prove also the authenticity of the information. Similarly to sym-
metric key encryption, when a receiver needs to verify a MAC, it will use the same
key the sender used to create the MAC. For instance, the Hashed MAC (HMAC)
is a particular type of MAC that employes a cryptographic hash function and a
secret key to compute the digest used to verify the integrity and the authenticity of
a message. Another example is the Cipher-Based MAC (CMAC), which instead of
a hash function, employs a block cipher and a secret key to compute the verifiable
digest.
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2.2.1.5 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures, called also public-key signatures, are another mechanism to safe-
guard the integrity and the authenticity of data. However, unlike MACs, they do
not use the same key to sign and check the data but they use public-key cryptog-
raphy instead. As already mentioned, the efficiency of public-key cryptography is
much lower than the symmetric one, thus, the hash-and-sign paradigm is applied
[51]. Indeed, if a signature scheme is provided for messages of a fixed length l and
a longer message m needs to be signed. Rather than signing m itself, it is possible
to apply a hash function Hash(m) to reduce the message to the fixed-length l and
then sign the result with the sender’s secret key sk. As a result, the hash-and-sign
paradigm gives the possibility to have a signature scheme for arbitrary-length mes-
sages [51]. Meanwhile, to check the digital signature, the receiver has to verify the
digest with the sender’s public key pk and recompute the hash of the data in order
to make sure that the two values are equal. In both cases, Digital Signatures and
MACs, the integrity is provided by the hash of the data and the authenticity by
the encryption of the hash. Hence, even if an attacker will be able to intercept and
modify the data, he will be able to compute also the hash of the new data but will
not be able to generate the corresponding MAC or Digital Signature.
2.2.1.6 Issues in Cryptography
As already mentioned, quantum computing is threatening the long-term security
of some of the most used cryptographic algorithms nowadays, and Post-Quantum
cryptography is trying to address this issue. However, there are other issues as well,
such as the difficulty of obtaining true random numbers and side-channel attacks.
The problem of generating random numbers especially applies to mobile and IoT
devices due to their scarce hardware resources, but it is present in more powerful
systems too. The main issue is the difficulty of implementing a perfect source of
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entropy for the random number generator, like a flip of a coin. As a consequence,
systems usually adopt pseudorandom number generators whose outcome may seem
random, but is deterministic and derived from a random seed. The lack of random-
ness in the generated numbers can lead to security issues like thousands of entities
having the same key or the generation of a weak one [52][53].
Side-channel attacks are another issue that is frequently encountered in cryp-
tography. These can take advantage of hardware-specific or implementation-specific
behavior to recover the secret key even when the cryptographic algorithm is work-
ing perfectly. Some examples of the effectiveness of this kind of attack, are the key
extraction of a 4096-bit RSA secret key from the GnuPG software through acous-
tic channels [54] and the recovery of the ECDSA private key in Mozilla’s Network
Security Services through ElctroMagnetic Analysis [55]. For instance, the final one
needs as few as 30 signatures to extract the whole private key of the signer and it
can be applied also to other algorithms like DSA and RSA [55].
2.2.2 Public Key Infrastructure
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is essential to guarantee the security of public-
key cryptography. In practice, it provides sets of policies and protocols to manage
the certificate used in asymmetric cryptography. As such, the PKI can be defined as
a tool that is "intended to provide mechanisms to ensure trusted relationships are es-
tablished and maintained. The specific security functions in which a PKI can provide
foundation are confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication" [56].
The problem that PKI is trying to solve is the need for trust in the binding between a
public key and its owner. PKI makes use of public-key Digital Certificates i.e. those
defined by the X.509 standard [57] and third-party trusted authorities to achieve
this goal. The certificate contains all the necessary information to identify the entity
owning the key pair and the public key itself. This information is usually verified
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by a Certificate Authority (CA), which will further sign the Digital Certificate with
its private key. Therefore, it authenticates the document and makes it trustworthy
for other participants in the communication system, who trust the same CA. The
signed certificates can be validated with the public keys of the CAs, which, usually,
are well-known and pre-distributed. As a result, CAs are binding the identity of
the owner to the specific public key, so, given that the CAs are trusted, also the
binding will be implicitly trusted. However, in order to be valid, a certificate does
not necessarily need to be signed by a Certificate Authority, it can be signed even
by the entity in the certificate itself. But the problem emerging when the certificate
is self-signed is that it cannot be trusted since no trusted entity signed it.
2.2.3 Remote Attestation
Remote attestation can be defined as a process that allows an entity to create and
send verifiable claims about its state to a remote third party. There are multiple
options to integrate remote attestation through a cryptographic protocol, however,
regardless of the implementation, some entities need to be involved in the protocol.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there is always a Relying Party or Appraiser which
needs to make a decision about some other party or parties [58]. A Target which
is the entity the decision needs to be taken about [58], and it means that this
will be the party that has to be attested. The last one is the Attester which
is the party that is going to collect all the claims about the target and produce
the attestation evidence. The attestation evidence is the proof containing all the
verifiable claims for the remote attestation and can be presented to the appraiser
either by the attester or the target [26]. The attestation claims are produced through
multiple measurements about the target, and they are signed by the Root of Trust.
The latter is a module with known behavior, which a certificate asserts to be present
on a particular platform [58]. The certificate of the module can be signed by its
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manufacturer’s CA and the CA in turn by a well-known web CA like GlobalTrust.
This is going to establish a chain of trust that can be used to obtain trusted claims




























Figure 2.1: Remote attestation process with validation against CA signed attestation
reference.
The appraiser, in order to validate the measurements about the target, needs to
compare them against some known-good values for the state of the target. These
values are known as attestation reference and can be provided by a third trusted
party. For instance, one possibility is that an attestation reference CA (trusted by
both parties through a certificate) provides to the attester the attestation reference
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signed with the CA private key. As a consequence, the attester now can include the
references with each attestation evidence in order to provide also the known-good
values to the appraiser.
2.2.4 Secure Channel Protocols
A protocol is defining "a set of rules or procedures for transmitting data between
electronic devices" [59] over a communication channel. Standardizing protocols is
essential for communication between devices because otherwise, the communicating
parties do not know how to exchange the messages. Therefore, many protocols exist,
each one ensuring specific features and security properties.
The secure channel protocol is crucial in guaranteeing the security of communica-
tion on the Internet "in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering,
and message forgery" [6]. A secure channel ensures data integrity, data confiden-
tiality, authentication of the communication endpoints, replay protection, and key
confirmation on a communication channel.
2.2.4.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
The most important secure channel protocol is TLS. TLS 1.3 is the latest, most
secure, and the recommended version of the protocol, thus, it will be the version
to which the TLS term refers in this thesis. The TLS protocol consists of three
sub-protocols, spaced into two layers, the Record Layer and the Handshake layer.
The first one is made by the Record protocol and is managing the messages for the
handshake layer and the application data. The record protocol provides fragmen-
tation, authenticated encryption, replay protection, and integrity check operations.
The second layer instead, is formed by two subprotocols, the Handshake and the
Alert protocols.
The Handshake protocol is used in the initial phase of the communication. It
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defines the cryptographic parameters to be used and allows the authenticated key
agreement (known also as AKE) between the entities via the use of certificates and
PKI. It also supports PSK-based handshakes, where no public-key authentication is
performed. The Handshake protocol in TLS 1.3 and illustrated in Figure 2.2, has
fewer steps than the previous versions of TLS and it works as follows:
1. At time 0-RTT (see Figure 2.2) the Client sends in the "ClientHello" message,
a noncec (a random value to provide freshness), the supported cipher suites,
and a keysharec trying to guess the key exchange group (e.g. P-256 or X25519)
the Server might use.
2. At time 0.5-RTT the Server selects a key exchange group offered by the
Client (or sends a HelloRetryRequest message). Then, it generates a key pair
in that group and sends in its ServerHello message the nonces and the public
key as its keyshares to the Client. The shared secret computed with the
two key shares is used to derive the encryption keys for all the messages sent
after the ServerHello. Some of these are the optional "CertificateRequest", the
"Certificate", and the "Finished" messages. The finished message contains a
hash of all the previous messages, and once it is sent, the Server can compute
the application data keys, which will be used for further communication.
3. At time 1-RTT the Client computes the shared secret and the encryption
keys, checks the certificate of the Server, generates the application data keys,
and if required, sends back its own "Certificate". Once also the Client sends
the "Finished" message, the handshake is concluded for the Client and it can
exchange application data over the secure channel.
4. At time 1.5-RTT the Server verifies the "Certificate" of the Client if it was
previously requested. Then, upon receipt of the "Finished" message from the
Client, the Server also considers the handshake finished and starts exchanging
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Figure 2.2: Handshake process in the Transport Layer Security protocol.
application data over the secure channel.
In contrast to the previous versions of the TLS protocol, TLS 1.3 has signif-
icantly simplified the selection of the cryptographic algorithms to be used in the
communication channel. Firstly the number of supported cipher suites has been
significantly reduced, both because some algorithms have become vulnerable, and
because such a vast choice led to the unsafe selection of the algorithm to combine.
Then, instead of using the MAC-than-encrypt construct for data integrity and confi-
dentiality (Section 2.2.1.1) like in TLS 1.2 the version 1.3 allows only Authenticated
encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher modes [6]. The AEAD approach is
similar to the encrypt-than-MAC way but simplified. Indeed, instead of requiring
the choice of two algorithms, one for the cipher and one for the mac, it requires the
selection of a single AEAD cipher mode that includes both.
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2.2.4.2 Trusted Channel
A secure channel, like the one empowered by the TLS protocol, provides protection
against attacks on the data in-transit and authentication of the endpoints. However,
even though there are guarantees in place that the data cannot be tampered or
eavesdropped during its transfer, there are no guarantees about the trustworthiness
of the endpoints themselves. Hence, they may be compromised and may e.g. leak all
the secret information to unauthorized third parties. To overcome this issue, remote
attestation can be used to establish trust in the endpoints of the channel. Thus, by
adding mutual remote attestation to a secure channel (e.g. TLS 1.3) it can be turned
into a trusted channel protocol. Here, the endpoints have the guarantee that none
of the parties participating in the trusted channel establishment is compromised.
One example of such a protocol is the TLS 1.3 based Trusted Sockets Layer
(TSL) protocol presented by Niemi et al. [18]. It extends the certificate-based au-
thentication of TLS 1.3 with mutual attestation by using just the callbacks provided
by traditional TLS libraries. As such, TSL is fully compliant with the RFC 5280
[60] and the TLS 1.3 specifications, therefore it does not require any change to the
implementation of the existing TLS libraries.
2.3 Terminology
2.3.1 Trusted Computing
Trusted Computing is addressing the problem of having trust in a system that is
processing the data. This can be done by using hardware-based techniques to isolate
critical data and its processing from the rest of the system. In an email to every
full-time employee dated in 2002, Bill Gates defined Trustworthy Computing as
"computing that is as available, reliable and secure as electricity, water services and
telephony" [61]. Hence, trusted computing’s goal is to have a system that behaves
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exactly how it is intended to. Trusted computing aims to give the system the ability
to issue reliable evidence on the state of the system, assuring that the system is
trustworthy.
2.3.2 Trusted Computing Base
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is the composition of all the hardware and
software components upon which the correct operation of a system strictly depends.
The TCB components are assumed to be trusted and that behave as expected even
without explicit proof. This means that the TCB should be bug and vulnerability
free because by compromising even a single component of the TCB, the protection
of the whole system can no longer be assumed [23]. For instance, if the operating
system is part of the TCB and it becomes compromised, it can maliciously manip-
ulate all the applications running on top of it nullifying all the security protections
of the individual applications. To obtain a vulnerability-free system, it is extremely
important to intensively review and check the correctness of the design and the code
implementation. However, it is usually infeasible to ensure that there are no security
flaws in a system, and the bigger the system is, the more this claim is true. That
is because the probability of bugs increases with the size of the system. For this
reason, it is recommended to have smaller TCBs in order to be able to ensure a
higher degree of security.
2.3.3 Secure/Trusted Execution Environment
A Secure Execution Environment (SEE), or also known as a Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE), allows an application to operate without interference from
untrusted code running on the same system. The SEE is created by a set of all the
components in the TCB and is strictly dependent on the correct implementation
of the protection measures of the TCB [23]. As a result, if the TCB is small,
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e.g. relying only on the CPU, the application inside an SEE cannot be tampered
with by other applications running on the system, nor by the operating system,
by the hypervisor, and by the user itself. In such a way, the application executing
into the SEE is protected even from components with higher privileges than the
application itself. The TCB is able to guarantee confidentiality and integrity to
SEEs through cryptographic functions and isolation. The confidentiality of the SEE
can be protected by encrypting the memory used or by isolating the memory and the
cache from the rest of the system through memory management mechanisms into
the TCB. Meanwhile, the integrity of the SEE can be verified by hashing everything
that has to leave the TCB, thus ensuring that even if encrypted, nobody can modify
the data without being detected[23]. There are several implementations of SEEs but
the most popular ones are ARM TrustZone [62] (see Section 3.2.3.1) for mobile and
IoT devices, and Intel SGX [14] (see Section 3.2.3.2) or AMD SEV [15] (see Section
3.2.3.3) for PCs and cloud environments.
2.3.4 Secure Enclave
A secure enclave can be defined as an isolated process, executed on a platform that
provides confidentiality and integrity of code and data against the untrusted code
running on the same system as well as sealing and attestation [63]. It is a particular
implementation of an SEE, where the application inside is protected from all the
other software on the platform. Its execution cannot be altered even by higher
privileged code such as SMM, BIOS, VMM, OS, etc [64]. Moreover, via remote
attestation, a remote party can obtain strong assurance about the precise software
running in the enclave and its trustworthiness [65].
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2.4 Secure Technologies
For the development of the secure enclave framework, the project team chose to
employ the technologies that are considered the best from a security and interop-
erability point of view. Rust and WebAssembly are examples since they can bring
additional values to the project compared to similar technologies such as the C
programming language or the Java Virtual Machine.
2.4.1 Rust
Rust is a system programming language designed to give deep control over the run-
ning time and memory usage to developers. As with other languages like C and
C++, it can be compiled directly onto the bytecode executed by hardware, thus
providing excellent performance as well [66]. However, in contrast to languages like
C++, Rust offers also strong safety guarantees with almost no data races, and mem-
ory errors like buffer overflows, stack overflows, and allocation/deallocation memory
issues [66]. Indeed, in Rust, there is the risk to introduce memory-safety bugs only
when unsafe code is explicitly used by the developer i.e. with the unsafe marker.
Otherwise, by assuming that the compiler is bug-free, the code should always be
protected by unintentional and intentional memory-safety bugs. All this is possible
thanks to Rust’s restricted ownership model. Here, there is a unique reference to
each live object in memory and this allows to statically track the lifetime of an
object at compile time (this property is broken by the unsafe marker). In this way,
there is no risk in dereferencing allocated memory, which makes Rust a memory-safe
programming language without the need to have a garbage collector at runtime that
frees the allocated memory [67]. The effectiveness of Rust’s approach to memory-
safe programming can be seen in a recent study on the memory vulnerabilities found
until 2021 [68]. The majority of the memory bugs found are only mild issues because
they only introduce the risk of violating the memory-safety design of Rust by using
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unsoundness libraries in the code [68].
Using the Rust programming language to achieve memory safe enclaves has al-
ready been addressed with the Rust-SGX [69] project. However, it is an implemen-
tation that is built upon the SGX SDK, thus, it is available only for Intel SGX
enclaves.
2.4.2 WebAssembly
To briefly introduce WebAssembly (Wasm) [70], it can be seen as "a binary format
for software written in any language, designed to eventually run on any platform
without changes" [71]. This unique characteristic allows the compilation of Rust
code into WebAssembly bytecode. The latter can be executed inside a WebAssem-
bly Interpreter (WASI) making it runnable on any system independently from the
architecture. Furthermore, WebAssembly is designed to provide also a secure exe-
cution environment thanks to its ability to sandbox the bytecode from the system
where it is running. However, these security statements have been challenged by
recent analyses, which are stating that Wasm still has some security issues [72].
Indeed, due to its design and the obfuscation of code inherently brought with the
abstraction, many of the vulnerabilities already solved in the past, such as stack
overflows, are becoming a threat again [72]. Fortunately, mitigations for the pre-
sented vulnerabilities already exist, and most of the issues related to memory safety
can be addressed at compile-time by memory-safe programming languages like Rust
[73]. Finally, the abstraction from the machine where the code is executing gives
to WebAssembly applications not only a higher degree of security but also code
mobility properties. Thus, it makes it possible to migrate the mobile code between
different devices and platforms independently from the hardware architecture, which
is ideal for mobile agent solutions.
3 Prior Art
3.1 Distributed Computing
At their inception, computer systems were conceived as monolithic computing de-
vices but soon they evolved into much more flexible client-server systems able to
serve a wider range of purposes. However, the high computational power required
by some applications nowadays motivated the rise of even more complex architec-
tures such as distributed computing systems. The latter consists of nodes that
are performing heterogeneous computations and communicate only occasionally to
achieve a common objective [74]. At the beginning of the ’90s, distributed comput-
ing systems were a topic of great importance in computer science, and technologies
supporting the development of distributed applications already existed [75]. For
instance, the CORBA object model was providing an architecture for the imple-
mentation of distributed applications where the client-server communication was
supported by the Object Request Broker [76]. Here, the network interfaces were
completely abstracted from the applications and clients were able to ask for tasks
to be done by servers without any knowledge about the server’s location or mode
of operation. Its first release was supporting only the C programming language but
additional ones were supported in later versions of CORBA [76].
Although distributed systems were well known, the concept of code mobility
emerged only with the introduction of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The latter,
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together with the web browser technology, came up with the possibility of running
executables on any platform independently from the hardware architecture. In con-
trast to previous implementations, this brought in the possibility to exchange not
only data messages or objects over the network, but also program code [77]. As
mentioned by Fong et al. [77] here it is wise to make a distinction between code
with strong mobility (also known as mobile agents) and code with weak mobility
(known as mobile code).
3.1.1 Mobile Code
As previously mentioned, a great advantage of mobile code, as opposed to traditional
executable code, is its ability to move and be run on any platform. However, once the
mobile code arrives at the hosting destination, its execution is started and completed
only on that specific host. Therefore, mobile code will have an outcome that can
be used directly by the hosting application or sent back to the source of the mobile
code for further operations. The movement of code in this specific mode of operation
can be called stateless migration because it does not require any particular state
of the mobile code to be transferred for its correct execution. Carzaniga et al.
[78] recognized two different approaches in the application of mobile code, Code on
Demand (COD) and Remote Evaluation (REV).
3.1.1.1 Code on Demand
In the COD approach, the client requests from the server the code to be executed,
the server sends the mobile code and the client executes it obtaining the desired
result. At its inception with Java Applets [79] and now with JavaScript [80], this
methodology is widely spread and used in any browser. Indeed, JavaScript is used
in 95% of the websites nowadays, meaning that is the most used type of software
worldwide [81].
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3.1.1.2 Remote Evaluation
Remote Evaluation can be seen as the opposite of Code on Demand. Indeed, here it
is the client that migrates the mobile code towards the server to be executed. One
of the simplest examples of this methodology is the rsh command [82] that enables
the execution of commands into remote shells. A more recent example is Amazon’s
serverless compute service, AWS Lambda [83], which provides the ability to migrate
your own mobile code to Amazon’s servers to be executed. For instance, this pro-
cedure comes in handy when resource-constrained devices require high demanding
computational functions to be executed.
3.1.2 Mobile Agents
In contrast to mobile code, mobile agents have strong mobility features, or in other
words, come with a stateful migration of the mobile code. As a consequence, instead
of initiating the execution of the code on the host where it is migrated, it can resume
its execution from the state where it was paused in the previous host. Therefore,
this ability means that the mobile agents are not restricted to client-server based
communication and allows them to migrate between multiple devices to execute the
desired operations. Outtagarts et al. [84] have identified multiple mobile agent based
applications in different domains, such as network management, wireless multimedia
sensors, electronic commerce, distributed data mining, security, and many more.
For all these applications, different platforms are available for their implementation.
Usually, each of the platforms serve the development of mobile agents aiming at
specific goals. For instance PIAX [85] integrates the P2P network as a mean for
the development of mobile agents in distributed environments, SensorWave [86]
aims at enhancing wireless sensor networks with mobile agents, and TACOMA [87]
was developed to provide system support for farmworkers [84]. Many other mobile
agent platforms exist [88], but among all, the Java Agent DEvelopment Framework
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(JADE) [4] turned out to be the most popular one in the academic and industrial
community [88].
Despite the increasing adoption of mobile agents in distributed systems and
mobile cloud computing, there are still several security issues to be addressed. For
instance, JADE, the most adopted platform, does not include any security protection
by default, and even with JADE Security Add-On there are still major security lacks
that need to be resolved to achieve data confidentiality [89].
3.2 Secure Execution Environments & Secure En-
claves
Secure Execution Environments have existed for more than a decade and in all these
years various possible implementations were adopted. The multiple solutions can
be categorized in three main categories: External security co-processor, Embedded
security co-processor, and Processor secure environment [90]. A high-level archi-
tecture is presented in Figure 3.1 for each of the just mentioned categories. The
Figure shows which hardware components are involved in the Secure Execution En-
vironments or the additional components required. As shown in the legend, the
fully green components are fully trusted components meanwhile, the ones that are
partially green are just partially trusted, and only the trusted section is employed
in the SEE. Further, the following sections will describe in detail each category and
the existing implementations.
3.2.1 External Security Co-Processors
This category of solutions provides dedicated Security Co-Processors that are placed
outside the System on Chip (SoC) containing the CPU as depicted on the left side of
Figure 3.1. As a such, this kind of solutions have their own memory and peripherals
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Figure 3.1: High level representation of the architectures in the different categories
of Secure Execution Environments.
and in addition to this, they can also enforce higher security standards than the
main device by deploying physical tamper-resistant mechanisms. Even though this
kind of design is beneficial to the isolation of the Secure Execution Environment
from the main system, they usually have less computational power, imply higher
costs for the implementation, and are associated with higher overheads due to their
location outside the SoC. These type of solutions are adopted when high-security
standards are required. For instance, they can be employed by both, businesses
to support payment transactions with HSM devices [91] or by customers to enable
mobile payment with the use of Secure Elements (Section 3.2.1.2).
3.2.1.1 Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
HSMs are peripheral devices or bus-connected to the host computer and are strictly
dedicated to the execution of cryptographic functions such as encryption/decryp-
tion of data or providing a source of entropy for random number generators [92].
Furthermore, in order to be considered an HSM, a device needs to be physically
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secure, tamper-resistant, and/or tamper-evident. This means that they are usually
equipped with coatings and backup batteries to be able to detect any physical in-
trusion and erase all the secure information in their memory [23]. To ensure these
properties, Hardware Security Modules have to undergo a special certification, the
FIPS 140. The latter is a publication series for the standardization of cryptographic
modules and usually certifies an HSM with one of the four levels of security de-
fined in the standard. The vast majority of HSMs are now certified with the FIPS
140-2 standard [93], however, a new FIPS 140-3 standard [94] was just introduced
and the the transition to the new certification has already begun [95]. The high
level of security provided by HSMs is mostly used in critical operations, such as
protecting transactions in POS devices and ATMs or ensuring the security of highly
sensitive information on the web. Although these devices provide a high level of
assurance, they cannot be always adopted due to their design. For instance, they
always require an external device to be plugged in, which usually is cumbersome,
thus, making them incompatible with mobile devices.
3.2.1.2 Removable Secure Elements
In contrast to the cumbersome external HSMs, Secure Elements provide integrated
hardware and software embedded in a mobile handset. The latter is enabling three
fundamental functionalities, a secure memory to store secrets and personal data,
cryptographic functions for secure data exchange and encryption, and a secure en-
vironment for code execution [96]. A Secure Element can be implemented as a
removable component in different solutions. The first option is to use the already
existing Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs) as a Secure Element for the SEEs.
Indeed it already carries out this task by authenticating the user in the network
of the operator [96]. A modern option is to use Universal Integrated Circuit Cards
(UICC) which are able to host multiple Java Card-based software applications. This
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particular solution has the advantage of interfacing with the mobile device but has
the drawback that it is tightly bound to the provider of the card since all the ap-
plications must be authorized by the issuer security domain of the card. Another
example of a removable Security Module is the Secure Memory Card (SMC) which is
a combination of a memory card and a smartcard [97]. It can provide high security
levels while being able to host a large number of applications due to the properties
of the two combined components.
3.2.2 Embedded Security Co-Processors
In contrast to the previous category, embedded security co-processors do not require
the users to acquire and insert additional hardware into the device to execute an
application inside a Secure Execution Environment. Moreover, by being integrated
with the CPU on the SoC (see Figure 3.1), it allows a greater share of resources while
still providing a high level of isolation. Although this approach is more suitable for
mobile devices, it still has significant constraints on the available resources, thus it
may not be suitable for the majority of applications [90].
3.2.2.1 eSIM - eUICC
The eSIMs and eUICCs are embedded secure elements that are aiming to solve
the problem of little space availability on wearable devices [98]. The problem is
addressed by soldering directly on the mobile device the eSIM or eUICC, so, allowing
the adoption of smaller hardware components. Since the soldered element cannot
be substituted, the eSIM and eUICC are enabling also the remote provisioning of
already issued SIM profiles.
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3.2.2.2 Apple Security Enclave Processor (SEP)
According to Apple SEP’s patent [12], "SEP may be isolated from the rest of the
SOC (e.g. one or more central processing units (CPUs) in the SOC, or application
processors (APs) in the SOC)". This statement and the following ones in the docu-
ment are giving us only little information on the actual implementation of SEP. The
security enclave processor seems to be built upon a dedicated ARMv7-A “Kingfisher”
core and to be strongly isolated from the AP [99]. In addition, SEP is provided with
dedicated hardware peripherals and memory that can be accessed only by itself [99].
However, the memory of the security enclave processor is very limited (e.g. 4096
bytes) and needs to use the external RAM to be able to operate [99]. Therefore, it
uses AES encryption to isolate the information stored on the external RAM from
the main processor.
3.2.2.3 Google’s Titan M chip
The Titan M chip is designed to provide strong physical isolation from the main
processor. Its CPU is a separate ARM Cortex-M3 microprocessor and the cache,
memory, and persistent storage are not shared with the rest of the system [11]. How-
ever, its resources are constrained, for instance, it tries to pack as many as possible
security features in only 64 KBytes of RAM [11]. An important note on Google’s
Titan M chip is that it tries to avoid the so-called "security through obscurity". As
a matter of fact, the design and the firmware of Titan M are going to be disclosed
to the public and only the root keys used to sign the Titan M firmware will be kept
secret by Google [11].
3.2.2.4 Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
A Trusted Platform Module is very similar to a Secure Element, and in the words of
Andrew Martin "it may be helpful to consider the TPM as like a smartcard soldered
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to the PC’s motherboard" [100]. Its main objective is to provide a root of trust
to the platform, which consequently helps in protecting against software attacks
by providing a sealed storage mechanism and local/remote attestation [23][100].
This solution was largely adopted in high-end desktop devices especially to provide
the Secure Boot option. When the system is powered on, the Root of Trust for
Measurement (RTM) is the first code to be executed and it will repetitively compute
the hash of the new code loaded and will verify its correctness. This particular
operation can be included in the storage sealing process, in this way, each time
a new piece of code is loaded during startup, if its hash is not correct, it cannot
decrypt the sealed memory due to the wrong resulting key.
3.2.3 Processor Secure Environments
The last category of hardware support for SEEs is the Processor Secure Environ-
ments. These are able to provide much more performance to the SEEs with respect
to the other solutions because they are implemented directly on the main processor
(see Figure 3.1). The isolation between the Secure Execution Environment and the
rest of the software is relying on hardware logic able to control which resources the
CPU can access in a certain state. Due to its particular design, this category of
solutions is usually more cost-effective, but they are more subject to side-channel
information leakage.
3.2.3.1 ARM TrustZone
Arm TrustZone [62], since its initial proposal in 2002 [13][64] has become the preva-
lent technology implementing TEEs in mobile environments and it is starting to be
employed also in industrial control systems, servers, and IoT [101]. TrustZone pro-
vides hardware-based security for System on Chip architectures, which are widely
used in mobile environments. The design principle used by TrustZone is to split the
3.2 SECURE EXECUTION ENVIRONMENTS & SECURE ENCLAVES 40
Execution Environment into two separate worlds, each one with its own user and
kernel space, cache, memory, I/O, and other resources [13]. The first one is named
Normal World or Rich Execution Environment (REE) because here runs the typical
OS of the device and all the untrusted applications. The second one, called Secure
World (TEE), contains a secure small kernel that is running in supervisor mode.
The latter provides the basic OS primitives to the Trusted Application (TA) running
in user mode [101][13]. The Secure Monitor is underlying both the environments
and it can be triggered by the two worlds with the System Monitor Call. The secure
monitor is in charge of all the mechanisms for the secure context switching between
worlds and protects the access to the NS bit, which identifies the currently execut-
ing world in the processor [101]. Due to its architecture design, TrustZone is able
to ensure almost the same level of performance as normal environments, the only
overhead is caused by the context switching between the two worlds. Despite its
advantages in terms of performance, TrustZone has also various drawbacks that are
limiting its adoption. In the first place, since the Secure World comprises both the
kernel and the user space, it implies a size of the TCB relatively larger compared
to other existing solutions such as Intel SGX. Then, the TA in the user space is
strictly dependent on the trusted kernel, thus, reducing the interoperability of the
various TAs between different TEEs. Furthermore, due to its design, this solution is
not suitable for cloud services because it only enables a single secure world. Cloud
services instead, need to instantiate multiple Secure Execution Environments on a
single physical machine (e.g. through VMs or Secure Enclaves). Finally, considering
that TrustZone is not encrypting the memory in use, it is also vulnerable to memory
attacks such as Cold-boot [102] threatening the confidentiality of the application by
someone able to physically access the device [103].
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3.2.3.2 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
In 2015, Intel introduced the Software Guard Extensions technology with the Skylake
processors, the 6th generation of Intel Core processors. SGX enables applications
to create hardware-based Secure Execution Environments called SGX enclaves. In
contrast to other existing SEEs, the Trusted Computing Base of Intel SGX is mini-
mal and it is composed only of the processor hardware and software and the secure
enclave itself. Thanks to its particular design, encryption mechanisms, and its essen-
tial TCB, Intel SGX guarantees the confidentiality and the integrity of applications
running inside the enclave even in a fully compromised environment [64]. Since In-
tel SGX causes severe overloads due to the memory encryption of each enclave, it
comes also with dedicated memory to improve its performance, called Enclave Page
Cache (EPC). In the latest implementations of Intel SGX, the memory of the EPC
is limited to 256MiB and it is storing the unencrypted pages of the enclave until
it gets full, afterward, it encrypts the pages of the enclave and stores them in the
main memory [17]. Even though this might be seen as a good solution, it has some
inconveniences too. First of all, Intel SGX is available only for Intel processors,
which are not widely used in mobile devices because it was mainly developed for
cloud applications with the need for severe security requirements. Another issue
with Intel SGX is that it causes a lot of overhead which lowers the performance of
the application inside the secure enclave from 9.54 times up to 19.31 times compared
to the normal environment [64]. Furthermore, there is also a major issue for the
developers using Intel SGX. In order to make the software run inside the secure
enclave, they have to split the software into two distinct sections, the trusted and
untrusted one. The last-mentioned requirement is complicating the migration pro-
cess on Intel SGX SEEs by a non-trivial amount [64]. Finally, despite the fact that
this seems to be the most secure solution nowadays, also Intel SGX is vulnerable to
some attacks, the most known ones are Meltdown [104] and Spectre [105], which, are
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using side-channel attacks to exfiltrate confidential information from the enclave.
3.2.3.3 AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
One year later, in 2016, AMD presented the Secure Encrypted Virtualization tech-
nology (SEV) [15], which, leverages a Platform Security Processor (PSP) and a
memory encryption engine to provide hardware-based security to the system [106].
AMD SEV comes with a solution similar to ARM TrustZone for the implemen-
tation of SEEs but with the difference that SEV is specifically designed for cloud
environments. In contrast to TrustZone, AMD SEV is designed to protect the whole
Virtual Machine running upon the hypervisor and not only the Trusted Application
inside the Secure World. This is possible because AMD SEV instantiates secure
Virtual Machines as SEEs protecting them from physical threats, other VMs, and
the VMM itself [64]. The last design is possible because the memory of each Virtual
Machine is encrypted with its own key generated by the PSP, which provides also
APIs to the hypervisor in order to manage the keys generated for the encrypted
VMs. Even though encryption is usually a heavy operation, thanks to the memory
encryption engine provided by SEV, its performance are identical to the normal VMs
[64]. However, one of the issues in AMD SEV is that the whole Virtual Machine is
considered as being part of the SEE, thus, the size of the TCB becomes really big,
so, it increases the probability of having unexpected behaviors and security issues.
3.2.3.4 ARM Confidential Compute Architecture
The ARM Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA) [16] was unveiled this year
2021 with the new ARMv9 microprocessors. More specifically, it is implemented on
the new ARMv9-A architecture and it aims at protecting the security and privacy
of the data while it is in use. The ARM CCA is built on TrustZone as its foundation
and is addressing the limitations of the latter technology. Indeed, TrustZone was
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previously available just for silicon vendors and OEMs. Meanwhile, the CCA’s am-
bition is to provide all the developers with the means to execute their applications
inside SEEs [107]. To achieve this goal the CCA provides attestable isolated envi-
ronments called Realms. The Realm environment does not substitute the TrustZone
but it is designed to run alongside the Secure World and the Normal World. In
fact, multiple Realms can be created on-demand by both, the applications running
in the Normal World and the TrustZone. The latter is called Arm Dynamic Trust-
Zone Technology, and enables TAs to perform memory-intensive operations, since
TrustZone has a limited memory allocated at boot by the Secure Monitor.
The CCA architecture places the Realm in an isolated environment where even
higher privileged components (e.g. hypervisor and TrustZone) cannot access its exe-
cution. The protection between these components is enforced by the Secure Monitor
running at EL3. However, differently from the previous TrustZone architecture, the
Secure Monitor manages the memory access through the Granule Protection Ta-
ble, which is used to check authorization for memory accesses. Furthermore, each
memory assigned to the Realm, Secure World, Normal World, or the Monitor, is
encrypted by the hardware before being written to the DRAM [107].
The Realms are not executing directly on the Secure Monitor, but on the Realm
Management Monitor (RMM). The RMM is in charge of managing the execution
environment of the Realm in order to guarantee its confidentiality and integrity even
between multiple Realms. However, the RMM is much smaller than a typical hy-
pervisor since it relies on the Normal World’s one for the (i) scheduling, (ii) resource
allocation, (iii) interrupts management, and (iv) device emulation [108]. The control
by the Normal World over these operations is enabled by the Realm Management
Interface (RMI) provided by the RMM. This implies also that the RMM has no
control over the execution of the Realm since the scheduling is performed by the
Normal World, and so, no availability guarantee is ensured. Finally, as aforemen-
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tioned, the Realms are attestable by third parties. This operation is enabled by the
Realm Service Interface (RSI), which allows Realms to request attestations for the
platform and the Realm itself.
3.2.3.5 Secure enclave frameworks
Keystone Keystone is an Open Framework for configuring, building, and instanti-
ating customized TEEs [109]. Keystone’s architecture can be seen as a mix of ARM
TrustZone and Intel SGX architectures [110]. Indeed, it takes inspiration from ARM
TrustZone, but thanks to the management of the memory in RISC-V, Keystone is
capable of handling multiple enclave instances instead of having a single Secure
World. This characteristic is enabled by the per-hardware-thread view of physi-
cal memory via machine-mode and Physical Memory Protection (PMP) registers
in RISC-V [109]. Furthermore, the present design allows enclaves to access disjoint
memory partitions while also opening up supervisor-mode and the Memory Manage-
ment Unit (MMU) for further isolation required by the enclave use [109]. As a result
Keystone’s enclave provides higher flexibility by enabling both, the implementation
of a lightweight or a full supervisor-mode OS.
Twine Twine is an Embedded Trusted Runtime designed to execute unmodified
language-independent applications [17]. To accomplish this, Twine is leveraging
WebAssembly’s feature of sandboxing the software runtime in order to abstract the
underlying environment from the application [17]. The abstraction gives the possi-
bility to the software developers to write their application in any language without
any constraint imposed by the underlying architecture. Thus, Twine is not a full
implementation of an SEE but can be seen as a mean to allow the applications
inside Twine to run independently from the SEE in which it is enclosed [17]. For
the moment Twine is implemented only on Intel SGX but it has the potential to be
implemented in other SEEs as well. Although its usage is theoretically possible on
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different architectures, the authors of Twine have not provided details on the attes-
tation and migration processes. Thus, the interoperability of the software between
different SEEs may be complex and difficult to implement.
3.2.4 Existing Attacks
The following section gives a brief description of the existing attacks against SEEs.
The focus of the attacks and the existing vulnerabilities are addressing mainly the
Processor Secure Environments due to their large adoption and the security issues
induced by the isolation at the main processor level. The attacks can be distin-
guished into three main categories based on the means they are using. The first
ones are leveraging side-channels to exfiltrate secret data from the cache, memory,
or execution processes, the second ones are aiming at modifying the state of the
secure data with fault-injection attacks, meanwhile, the last one is exploiting the
vulnerabilities in the TEE software code.
3.2.4.1 Side Channel attaks
A side-channel is a communication channel that was not intended or designed to
transfer information between a sender and a receiver, and where the sender is not
aware that he is disclosing information [23]. In other words, the data leaked is
only a side effect due to the implementation of some functionality. The side channel
can be built upon timing, electromagnetic emanations, power consumption, acoustic
emanation, thermal emanations, and possibly other means [23].
This kind of threats, require an active attacker, which leverages timing side chan-
nels [111][112] to infer on secret directly from the execution of secure code [113], or
from the data stored in the cache through attacks like Prime + Probe [114] and
Flush + Reload [115]. Side channel attacks can be used also in combination with
other techniques to exfiltrate information, some recent examples are the Meltdown
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[104], Foreshadow [116], and Spectre [105] attacks. These are exploiting the vulner-
abilities of speculative execution in modern processors to store secret data in cache
and then infer on it with the use of side channel attacks.
3.2.4.2 Fault-injection attacks
Fault-injection attack is primary a physical attack on the device to inject the fault in
the system deliberately to change its intended behavior and by such compromise the
security algorithm/crypto in order to access the encrypted data. In order to achieve
this goal, the attacker is using unconventional means whose original purpose are
not to modify the data on the system. Some examples using these means are the
Rowhammer [117] and the CLKSCREW [118] attacks, where physical properties
of the system are exploited in order to manipulate the data and the code running
on the system. For instance, Rowhammer is leveraging the implementation of the
system’s memory through capacitors. The latter cannot be perfect and need constant
refreshes to maintain the charge in the cell indicating the bit stored. Rowhammer
takes advantage of this physical imperfection and by accessing with specific patterns
the adjacent cells, it can impact the charge on the target cell and flip its value.
These kinds of attacks can be used not only to damage the integrity of the code
but also to defeat the availability of an entire system. For example, with the SGX-
Bomb [119] attack it is possible to exploit the integrity protection mechanism of
Intel SGX enclaves and perform a severe DoS attack on the system.
3.2.4.3 SEE Software implementation Attacks
As already mentioned in the TCB definition, having a large amount of code is in-
creasing the probability of presenting bugs and vulnerabilities in the software. This
behavior can be observed especially in the modern processor secure environments,
where more code is needed to guarantee the isolation of the SEEs. These vulnera-
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bilities can be introduced in both, the implementation of the SEE and the trusted
application running inside the SEE. Some of the existing attacks are taking advan-
tage of typical software vulnerabilities like the lack of input validation [120][121][122]
[123]. Other attacks instead are using more sophisticated mechanisms like the con-
fused deputy [124] or the rollback technique [125].
4 Architecture
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the secure enclave framework developed
at Huawei, focusing on the aspects that are relevant to the migration scheme. We
do not, for example, cover the Software Development Kit (SDK) in detail. While
the SDK is essential for end-users of the framework, it is still under development










































Figure 4.1: Secure enclave framework architecture.
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The elements constituting the secure enclave framework are illustrated in Figure
4.1. The presented architecture is identical on every instance of our secure enclave,
independently from being a source/migrator or destination/target instance in the
migration scheme. In the figure, green boxes represent components that can be
implemented by the developer using the SDK planned for the project. Here, the
Mobile agent is the migratable and architecture-agnostic element that the architec-
ture aims to protect. The blue and yellow components instead, are developed by the
OEM and are the core of the secure enclave architecture. The implementation of
the yellow modules is specific to the hardware architecture of each platform, while
the implementation of the blue ones is common in any instance of the secure enclave
framework regardless of the underlying hardware architecture.
The architecture is composed of three main elements:
• The host application or host app, running in the normal operating system of
the host device, along with the other untrusted user-space applications.
• The secure enclave, an SEE protected by the hardware-assisted isolation.
• The enclave harness, which is part of the TCB and responsible for the hardware-
assisted isolation of the secure enclave.
Each of these components is divided into more specific submodules, each with a
distinct task for the correct operation of the infrastructure, as described below.
4.1 Host application
The host application is running in the user space of the device along with the other
untrusted applications managed by the (untrusted) OS. The component consists of
three submodules, (i) the host application logic, (ii) the host migrator, and (iii) the
enclave driver.
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4.1.1 Host application logic
The host application logic is the actual end-application written by the developer.
Therefore, it usually requires a great amount of resources that typically are not
available inside a secure enclave. So, for this reason, the host application logic is
located in the untrusted environment, in order to take advantage of all the resources
available on the platform. Therefore, whenever the implemented program has the
need to perform a task that requires SEE-guarantees and possibly migration capa-
bilities, it has the ability to launch an enclave-bound mobile agent that shall perform
the duty. The implementation of the host application logic can be achieved within
the framework SDK and it is the only module in the untrusted environment that is
not provided by the OEM.
4.1.2 Host Migrator
The host migrator submodule is one of the core components running in the untrusted
environment and is contributing to the correct migration of the mobile agents be-
tween the different secure enclave instances. The main duties of this module are:
• to handle the initiation of the migration procedure,
• to manage the communication between the host app and the secure enclave,
• and to handle the TCP communication among the source and target instances.
Given that the module is providing the TCP connection between the source and
destination enclave, all the data exchanged among the two secure enclave instances
have to pass through the host migrator. However, even though the migrator runs
in the REE, the security of the mobile agent migration is not threatened because
all migration messages leaving the secure enclave are already encrypted within the
enclave by the Trusted Sockets Layer (TSL) library present in the enclave runtime
(see Section 4.2.2.5).
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4.1.3 Enclave driver
The role of the enclave driver component is to provide to the host application logic
the means to administrate the secure enclave on the platform. These, mainly consist
of the possibility of instantiating secure enclaves on-demand and loading the mobile
agent into the secure enclave. In addition to this, the enclave driver manages also
the communication between the host application and both, the enclave runtime and
enclave harness. The latter capability is required for the execution of the security-
critical tasks (as mobile agents) in the SEE requested by the end-user’s programs,
and the migration of the mobile agent itself.
4.2 Secure enclave
The secure enclave is a Secure Execution Environment and as such, it is running
inside the hardware-assisted isolation domain provided by the enclave harness. Each
instance of a secure enclave accommodates an enclave runtime and a mobile agent.
The mobile agent can be instantiated in two different manners, (i) either by the
host application logic through the enclave driver, (ii) or by receiving it from another
secure enclave instance. The enclave runtime instead, is preinstalled on the platform
and cannot be migrated to other devices.
The source code of the enclave runtime and its submodules is the same for all
instances, but must be separately compiled for each hardware architecture. All
this is possible thanks to the support provided by the enclave harness, which is
specifically implemented for each platform and provides an abstraction layer between
the hardware and the secure enclave (see Section 4.3).
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4.2.1 Mobile Agent
The mobile agent is a WebAssembly bytecode (Wasm) program. This allows it to be
executed in a platform-agnostic environment. This remarkable ability is what makes
it suitable for its migration between different secure enclave instances independently
from the hardware architecture. The last-mentioned feature is supported by the
enclave runtime, which ensures that the destination instance is trustworthy and the
security guarantees are not violated during its relocation.
Similarly to the host application logic, the mobile agent is not provided by the
OEM and its implementation can be accomplished within the framework SDK. A
further value brought by WebAssembly is that the mobile agent can be developed in
any programming language as long as it can be compiled to WebAssembly bytecode.
4.2.2 Enclave runtime
The enclave runtime incorporates a real-time operating system1 (RTOS) that ensures
support for all remaining subcomponents of the module. The RTOS is based on the
FreeRTOS kernel [126], a kernel with a tiny footprint and proven robustness. In
particular, the FreeRTOS-rust project [127] is used, which is a wrapper for the
FreeRTOS kernel that simplifies its usage in embedded applications written in Rust,
or in this case, inside secure enclaves.
In addition to an execution environment, the kernel provides also (i) scheduling
and (ii) intertask communication for the tasks2 executing within the enclave runtime.
And so, it empowers the "simultaneous" execution of multiple submodules and the
1An OS that normally provides a highly deterministic execution pattern and response to external
events. Usually employed in embedded systems that must satisfy strict deadlines (in the order of
milliseconds) in response time.
2For more details on the concept of "Task" in the FreeRTOS kernel and RTOS in general refer
to [128]
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exchange of information between them.
4.2.2.1 WebAssembly Interpreter
The WebAssembly Interpreter (WASI) is the module that creates the execution
environment for the mobile agent and it consists of our WASI prototype. The
prototype is an extension of the WASMI interpreter [129] which adds the pausing,
serialization, deserialization, and resumption features to the standard version of
it. Although interpreters that already offer these features exist, such as Wasmer
[130], our decision was driven by other factors. The choice of adopting the WASMI
interpreter can be mainly attributed to three characteristics:
• The Rust-based implementation, which is preferred for its memory-safety
guarantees.
• The small code size. This is critical because in our architecture the inter-
preter runs in an SEE. And so, by being part of the elements that are executed
in an SEE it is recommended to have a small footprint in order to lower the
probability of a bug occurring. In addition to this, the secure enclave may
have restricted resources (e.g. Intel SGX).
• The no_std support, that is a crate-level3 attribute in Rust which means
that the crate will not include the standard library of Rust (and any API
providing platform integration), and so making it platform-agnostic. Further,
this reduces the code footprint making it ideal for our usage.
An additional benefit of the Wasm interpreter and WebAssembly bytecode is that
each mobile agent will be executed within a sandboxed environment that separates
it from the enclave runtime through fault isolation techniques [131]. And so, any
3A crate is a compilation unit in Rust
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mobile agent will be prevented from escaping the sandbox without going through
appropriate APIs [131].
4.2.2.2 Agent serializer
The agent serializer can be seen as a submodule of our WASI prototype. It is the
component that contains all the features added to the WASMI interpreter. These
features play a key role in the migration procedure since they are performing prepara-
tory and conclusive operations on the mobile agent’s code and state. As mentioned
in the above section, the additional features are:
• Pausing: the execution of the mobile agent needs to be suspended for the
migration to take place. This activity is far from trivial because the mod-
ule needs to be aware if the mobile agent is performing a critical operation
that cannot be interrupted or if the execution is in a state that allows the
suspension, and thus the migration to occur.
• Serialization: once the mobile agent was paused in a safe state, it is not
ready to migrate yet. The running bytecode as well as the current state of
execution and the internal data structures, need to be serialized in order to be
transferred. As an additional step, during the serialization process, the data
is also compressed in order to optimize the transmission of the information.
• Deserialization: once the serialized mobile agent arrives at the target secure
enclave, it needs to be deserialized and decompressed to resume its execution.
This operation will result in obtaining on the destination instance the same
internal representation of the mobile agent as it was on the source one.
• Resumption: finally, the bytecode, state, and data structures are loaded
back into the Wasm interpreter and the execution is ready to be resumed from
where it was interrupted.
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4.2.2.3 Enclave migrator
The enclave migrator is the migration logic inside the secure enclave. Its main task is
to orchestrate the migration process between the source and target secure enclave by
employing the enclave attester, the TSL library, and the agent serializer modules.
To accomplish this duty, the enclave migrator is supporting the Trusted Sockets
Layer protocol (TSL) [18] in establishing a trusted channel between the instances.
The last-mentioned protocol will ensure that both instances are trustworthy and
that none of the security guarantees ensured by the hardware-assisted isolation will
be violated during the transfer of the mobile agent.
In addition to managing the modules participating in the migration scheme, the
enclave migrator handles also the communication between the secure enclave and
the host migrator. The communication between these elements is assisted by the
shared memory provided by the enclave driver module.
4.2.2.4 Agent attester
The agent attester module is one of the two components producing the attestation
claims and evidence for the trusted channel establishment. The evidence are deci-
sive in the remote attestation procedure since they state the trustworthiness of the
attested party. The specific attestation claims produced by the agent attester are
computed on the mobile agent’s state and bytecode. The claims are then combined
with the freshness guarantees and the channel bindings in order to form the attesta-
tion evidence that will be signed by the enclave runtime. The attestation evidence
over the mobile agent together with the ones over the platform, define the identity
of the mobile agent within a specific migration and can be used by the appraiser to
check its trustworthiness.
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4.2.2.5 Trusted Sockets Layer library
The TSL library is the unit implementing the trusted channel protocol defined by
Niemi et al. [18]. The library is an extension to a proprietary, size-optimized, stand-
alone TLS 1.3 library. The decision of using this specific library was driven by its
(i) tiny code size footprint, (ii) lack of dependencies, (iii) ease-of-extension using
callback interfaces. In addition to this, our TLS 1.3 library gives also the possibility
to compute the early_exporter_master_secret4without transmitting early data in
the connection. This secret is employed by the TLS-Exporter4 in the generation of
the challenge that is included in the attestation evidence.
4.3 Enclave harness
The enclave harness is part of the TCB and is supporting the instantiation of secure
enclaves on different platforms. It is specifically implemented for each hardware
architecture to leverage its specific hardware isolation techniques. In addition to
hardware-assisted isolation, the enclave harness features also an abstraction layer
between the hardware and the secure enclave. This brings a major benefit because
it gives the possibility to have a single implementation of the enclave runtime that
can run on any hardware architecture. Another relevant component to our scheme
is the platform attester that will be presented next.
4.3.1 Platform attester
The platform attester is the second component in the architecture that is in charge
of generating attestation claims and evidence in the remote attestation process. Its
role is to measure the platform TCB and the enclave runtime in order to produce
and sign the attestation claims about these two elements. The claims over the TCB
4See RFC 8446 for further details [6]
4.3 ENCLAVE HARNESS 57
are specific to each platform architecture since they are dictated by the platform’s
attestation mechanisms. For instance, TPM-based attestations can be used in de-
vices equipped with a TPM module, meanwhile TEE-based attestation can be used
in ARM-based mobile devices.
5 Migration design
As specified in the previous section, architecture agnostic code, like the WebAssem-
bly bytecode is ideal for mobile agent applications. However, this property alone is
not enough. By definition, a mobile agent needs a migration mechanism supporting
its mobility between various platforms.
5.1 Requirements
Although migration of mobile agents and migration of SEEs are not new concepts,
the migration of mobile agents between SEEs on different architectures is still a
rather unexplored area. By definition, mobile agents are software with strong mo-
bility features. As such, the migration mechanism should ensure that a mobile agent
can move from one platform to another via a stateful migration.
On top of this, our mobile agents are running inside SEEs. And so, their mobility
capabilities should not have an impact on the security guarantees enforced during
their execution.
5.1.1 Security Requirements
Even though the architecture described in the previous chapter serves as an infras-
tructure for both the execution and the migration of mobile agents, the security
requirements are issued separately for these two procedures. For the execution of
mobile agents, our requirements are extracted from [132][19][133]:
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1. Security of the mobile agent against attacks from the platform: The
platform shall provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability to the mobile
agent state and execution, such that the agent is protected from attacks by
the untrusted environment of the platform. In addition the platform shall be
able to give reliable evidence and authentication of the isolated SEE hosting
the mobile agent to ensure trustworthiness in the system.
2. Security of the platform against attacks by the mobile agent: The
mobile agent shall be distinguishable via an identity for access control, au-
diting, and non-authentic variants of it. Furthermore, the mobile agent shall
be sandboxed from the platform such that it cannot damage or attack the
platform.
3. Security of the mobile agent against attacks from the network: The
mobile agent migration shall occur over a trusted channel (see Section 2.2.4.2).
4. Security of the mobile agent migration: The migration shall assure that
mobile agents keep executing in a secure environment, i.e. if the requirements
1. & 2. hold in the source platform they must also hold in the target platform.
The last two requirements heavily rely on the architecture, the migration scheme
and the trusted channel supporting the relocation of mobile agents. The following
requirements are specific to the secure migration of mobile agents and this thesis:
• SR1 (Secure channel). The communication shall provide confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, and freshness of the messages exchanged on the channel.
The channel establishment shall provide mutual authentication of the channel
endpoints while preserving their privacy.
• SR2 (endpoint trustworthiness). For the establishment of a trusted chan-
nel, the endpoints shall mutually attest to each other by providing reliable at-
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testation evidence about themselves and their TCB state. The trusted channel
shall never be confirmed without valid attestation.
• SR3 (Channel binding). The mutual attestation shall be strongly bound
to a specific Trusted Sockets Layer handshake. As such it shall be valid only
if generated by the endpoints participating in the communication to protect
from relay and collusion attacks1.
• SR4 (Privacy). The attestation privacy, identities, and mobile agents shall
be protected against eavesdropping from unauthorized third parties even on
the local platform.
• SR5 (Forward security). The disclosure of long-term keys shall not endan-
ger past migrations by any means.
5.2 Migration phases
The secure migration of mobile agents in the secure enclave framework developed by
the Huawei team, consists of multiple steps. These can be named as (i) snapshotting,
(ii) serialization/deserialization, (iii) attestation, (iv) transmission, and (v) resump-
tion. The secure migration scheme described in this thesis and proposed in the paper
"Towards Secure Mobile Agents" by Pop et al. [19] is formed by a composition of
these steps.
In the presented migration scheme, the phases can be distinguished between
the ones that are specific to the mobile agent and the ones that involve the whole
architecture. For instance, the snapshotting, serialization, deserialization, and re-
sumption phases imply operations just over the mobile agent’s state and code and
1A situation where the attacker is able to extract the attestation from a valid secure enclave
and present it to the appraiser as its own.
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occur fully within the same secure enclave (source or target). Meanwhile, the at-
testation and the transmission phases have a broader scope. That is because they
include also the state of the platform (e.g. in the case of the attestation), or be-
cause they address the whole SEE-to-SEE communication mechanism supporting
the Trusted Sockets Layer protocol implementation.
5.2.1 Snapshotting & Resumption
Snapshotting is the process of pausing the mobile agent and providing to the seri-
alization procedure the internal representation of the interpreted code and state of
the mobile agent. In contrast to just stopping the WebAssembly bytecode running
on the Wasm interpreter, pausing it is a more demanding operation. In the pausing
procedure, the execution state needs to be saved/snapshotted in order to be able to
resume its execution from the exact state where it was suspended. To achieve this,
the running mobile agent needs to be in a safe state for the snapshotting to take
place. The executing bytecode cannot just be paused at any state because it may
be in the middle of a critical operation that cannot be interrupted. To address this
issue, there are two possible solutions:
1. To insert calls to a function in the mobile agent source code that would period-
ically check if it is time to trap the execution or not. These calls can be placed
in loops or functions that have high probability to be executed frequently.
2. To insert a similar call as above, but at compilation time. In this scenario, the
call can be optionally inserted by the compiler in a way that assures its call
so often that will give the possibility of trapping the execution.
Due to its straightforward implementation, the solution adopted for our proof-of-
concept is the first one and the trapping function is included in the agent serializer
module of the architecture. Its integration in our migration process gives us the
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possibility to pause the mobile agent in a safe state and continue by snapshotting
it. The objects representing the WebAssembly bytecode and the execution state
can be fetched from the WASMI interpreter. For instance, the Globals, Memories,
Functions, and Tables objects representing the WebAssembly bytecode and values
are contained in the ModuleInstance structure. Meanwhile, the ValueStack and
CallStack objects can be retrieved from the InterpreterState structure and represent
the state of the mobile code. At this point, once all the data objects are brought
together, the serialization phase is ready to take over.
The resumption phase is the last one and it enables the mobile agent to resume
its execution. As such it occurs on the destination enclave. Once the mobile agent
has arrived and its interpreted code and state have been decompressed and deseri-
alized (as described in the next section), the resumption phase can take place. This
takes the deserialized objects from the deserialization phase, builds back the inter-
nal representation of the WebAssembly bytecode and state, and loads them into the
new Wasm interpreter. At this point, the interpreter has all the data structures
representing the identical state where the mobile agent was interrupted, and so, its
execution is ready to be resumed from the instruction present just after the trapping
function call.
5.2.2 Serialization & Deserialization
The serialization procedure gives the possibility to the mobile agent to be transmit-
ted over the network. This phase consists in converting the internal representation of
the WebAssembly bytecode and its state in a stream of bytes able to be transferred
over the network.
The serialization takes the results of the snapshotting phase and uses the CBOR
data serialization format [134] to encode the outcome data structure. As can be seen
in Listing 5.1 the CBOR structure includes both, the mobile agent’s interpreted code
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and state as they were snapshotted in the previous phase.
L i s t <Globals> # Global v a r i a b l e s
L i s t <Memories> # Memory bu f f e r s
L i s t <Functions> # Source code
L i s t <Tables> # Function r e f e r e n c e s
L i s t <ValueStack> # Local v a r i a b l e s
L i s t <Cal lStack> # PC and return s i t e s
Listing 5.1: Data structure representing the mobile agent’s code and state that are
transferred in the migration process
The CBOR serialized structure above represented is generated with the Serde
framework. Serde is a tool for serializing and deserializing Rust data structures
to and from different formats, CBOR included [135]. In order to optimize the data
transfer between the different modules of the architecture and the transport over the
network, the serialized data is subject also to compression operations. These are not
performed over all the CBOR structure, but just over the objects that usually allow
a high degree of compression, like the memory buffers. For instance, small mobile
agents do not use entirely their memory pages, and so the remaining memory is full
of zeroes that can be highly compressed.
The result of the above operations is the plaintext migration package that will
be sent to the target secure enclave. Once the data has arrived at the target, the
procedures must be performed in reverse to get back the internal representation of
the mobile agent execution. The collection of all these tasks carried out in a reverse
manner can be defined as the deserialization phase and it is the last phase before
the resumption.
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5.2.3 Attestation
The attestation phase plays a key role in the establishment of the trusted channel
between the source and the target secure enclaves. It produces the proof used in
the remote attestation to prove the trustworthiness of the migration endpoints. As
described in the Architecture, the agent attester and the platform attester are the
modules in charge of producing the attestation claims over the mobile agent and
platform components (see Section 4.2.2.4 & 4.3.1). In particular, the two modules
produce the following claims:
1. The TCBAttestationClaims, produced by the platform attester and con-
sisting of the measurements of the TCB (enclave harness included).
2. The RuntimeAttestationClaims generated by the platform attester and
related to the enclave runtime.
3. The AgentAttestationClaims, produced by the agent attester and including
both, the code and the state of the mobile agent.
It is important to note that the AgentAttestationClaims are computed just at
the source secure enclave, and so verified just by the target enclave. Meanwhile,
the TCBAttestationClaims and the RuntimeAttestationClaims shall be computed
on both endpoints and must be mutually validated by the enclaves. As illustrated
in Listings 5.3, 5.4, & 5.5, the claims are described as ASN.1 data types. ASN.1
is a notation described in the X.680 specification [136] and its purpose is to define
the syntax of structured information data. Furthermore, as can be seen in the
structures of the claims, all three include the challenge generated by the trusted
channel. The just mentioned challenge is computed by employing the TLS-Exporter
to extract keying material from the handshake of the Trusted Sockets Layer protocol.
The TLS-Exporter is a specific mechanism specified in the TLS 1.3 protocol [6] (on
whom the TSL protocol is based) and it is the recommended technique for exporting
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handshake-specific secret key material. As such it ties each of the aforementioned
claims to a unique handshake, and so, a unique trusted channel.
Designing the attestation of the TCB and the runtime is a task far from trivial.
Indeed, this implies designing the operations of the platform attester, which has to
be implemented specifically for each platform. The major problems arise from the
type of attestation evidence that each platform is able to provide for the TCB and
enclave runtime.
For instance, as can be seen on the left side of the Figure 5.1, ARM-based mobile
phones usually confirm the trustworthiness of the device by attesting the existence
of a device key in their TEE after they have been securely booted. The secure boot
is a mechanism where an initial immutable image is cryptographically verifying the
digital signature of the image that it loads. This process is done in turn by the just
loaded image with the next image to be loaded up to the OS kernel [137]. In this
scenario, the attestation of the key contains claims that describe the TEE and device
state e.g. whether the secure boot was used. And so, even though these devices
typically do not provide measurements over the state of the TCB like TPMs. It is
possible to implicitly trust the TCB components (enclave harness included) under
the condition that the device key has been remotely attested. The device key in turn
will be used to attest the harness key, which again will be used to attest the enclave
runtime. As a result, the attestation evidence produced by the platform attester, in
this case, are two, the TCBAttestationEvidence and the RuntimeAttestationEvidence
as shown in Figure 5.1, defined in Listings 5.3 & 5.4, and represented in Figure 5.3
as TCBEv & RuntimeEv.
Another example of platform attestation is on platforms equipped with a TPM.
Here a different mechanism is adopted to attest the TCB. The TCBAttestation-
Claims consist of dynamic measurements collected by the TPM during the boot
process of the device. The measurements are collected in specific registers of the
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TPM and include the enclave harness as well. For the attestation, the TPM provides
specific APIs that take the just mentioned registers signs them, and provides the
signature composing the TCBAttestationEvidence. Furthermore, the TPM also pro-
vides the possibility to include user-defined values in the registers. As a consequence,
this enables the inclusion of the enclave runtime in the TCBAttestationEvidence as
shown on the right section of Figure 5.1.
These two examples are clear proof of the discrepancy in the attestation proce-
dures of the TCB for each platform and that is why in the TCBAttestationEvidence
sent in the handshake, also the attestationType is included (see Listing 5.3). The
type is used as a mean for the verifier to select the correct validation procedure
while processing the TCBAttestationReference. Where the last-mentioned records
are preinstalled, signed by the Migration SubCA, and represent a good value for the
state of the platform as will be explained more in detail in Section 5.2.3.1.
From the examples above, we can also imply that the RuntimeAttestationEvi-
dence is not always required to be sent separately. That is because its claims may be
included in the TCBAttestationEvidence. However, the RuntimeAttestationClaims
even though are generated by the platform attester, are not platform-specific. In
fact, the claims over the enclave runtime consist just of its SHA-256 digest as rep-
resented by the runtimeHash and the challenge in the Listing 5.4.
As the RuntimeAttestationClaims, also the AgentAttestationClaims are indepen-
dent from the platform since the implementation of the agent attester is common
across all secure enclaves. As illustrated in Listing 5.5 the AgentAttestationClaims
consist of the codeHash, the currentStateHash, the challange, an optional log, and
the timestamp. The first two fields are the SHA-256 digests computed respectively
on the WebAssembly bytecode and the state of the execution. The challenge, as
in the TCBAttestationEvidence, provides the freshness and channel binding guar-
antees. The last two fields provide additional information to the target, e.g. the
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Figure 5.1: Attestation claims contained in the attestation evidence of the three
components: (i) TCB, (ii) enclave runtime, and (iii) mobile agent; and the private
keys used to sign them.
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last platforms where the mobile agent was executed in the log field or the time of
pausing in the timestamp.
The AgentAttestationEvidence containing the claims about the agent is illus-
trated in Listing 5.5 and Figure 5.1, and it is represented in Figure 5.3 as AgentEv.
The latter evidence is optionally signed by the enclave runtime and included in
the certificate issued for the TSL endpoint authentication ephemeral public key.
Here, the signature over the AgentAttestationEvidence is optional since the run-
time is signing also the issued certificate. And so, the signature can be omitted as
an optimization to avoid the double signature by the runtime. The certificate also
includes the records mentioned earlier, which are (i) the TCBAttestationEvidence,
(ii) the TCBAttestationReference, and if available (iii) the RuntimeAttestationEvi-
dence and (iv) the RuntimeAttestationReference. The collection of all these records
resulted in the AttestationEvidence ASN.1 data structure illustrated by Listing 5.2
and represented in the Figure 5.3 as AttEv. The ASN.1 structure is encoded in the
certificate accordingly to the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) defined in the
X.690 specification [138]. The choice of the ASN.1 DER encoding was done on the
base that it is binary (compact), unique (can be safely signed), and widely supported
by encoders.
Attestat ionEvidence : := SEQUENCE {
tcbEvidence TCBAttestationEvidence ,
tcbReference TCBAttestationReference ,
runtimeEvidence [ 0 ] RuntimeAttestat ionEvidence OPTIONAL,
runt imeReference [ 1 ] Runt imeAttestat ionReference OPTIONAL,
agentEvidence [ 2 ] AgentAttestat ionEvidence OPTIONAL }
TCBAttestationReference : := SEQUENCE {
metr i c s SEQUENCE OF ReferenceMetr ic ,
s i g n e r I n f o S igner In fo ,
s i gnatureAlg A lgo r i thmIden t i f i e r ,
s i gna tu r e OCTET STRING }
ReferenceMetr ic : := SEQUENCE {
metr ic OCTET STRING }
RuntimeAttestat ionReference : := SEQUENCE {
runtimeVers ion OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
runtimeHash OCTET STRING,
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s i g n e r I n f o S igner In fo ,
s i gnatureAlg A lgo r i thmIden t i f i e r ,
s i gna tu r e OCTET STRING }
S igne r In f o : := SEQUENCE {
i d en t i t y CHOICE {
x509Cert [ 0 ] SEQUENCE OF Ce r t i f i c a t e ,
rawPubKey [ 1 ] SEQUENCE OF OCTET STRING } }
Listing 5.2: Attestation extension ASN.1 structure data types
TCBAttestationEvidence : := SEQUENCE {
attes tat ionType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ,
tcbClaims TCBAttestationClaims ,
s i g n e r I n f o S igner In fo ,
s i gnatureAlg A lgo r i thmIden t i f i e r ,
s i gna tu r e OCTET STRING }
TCBAttestationClaims : := SEQUENCE {
metr i c s [ 0 ] SEQUENCE OF Metric ,
cha l l enge [ 1 ] OCTET STRING }
Metric : := SEQUENCE {
metr ic OCTET STRING }
Listing 5.3: TCB Attestation Evidence ASN.1 structure data types
RuntimeAttestat ionEvidence : := SEQUENCE {
runtimeClaims RuntimeAttestationClaims ,
s i g n e r I n f o S i gne r In f o OPTIONAL,
s ignatureAlg A l go r i t hmIden t i f i e r OPTIONAL,
s i gna tu r e OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
RuntimeAttestationClaims : := SEQUENCE {
runtimeHash [ 0 ] OCTET STRING,
cha l l enge [ 1 ] OCTET STRING }
Listing 5.4: Runtime Attestation Evidence ASN.1 structure data types
AgentAttestat ionEvidence : := SEQUENCE {
agentClaims AgentAttestat ionClaims ,
s i g n e r I n f o S igner In fo ,
s i gnatureAlg A lgo r i thmIden t i f i e r ,
s i gna tu r e OCTET STRING }
AgentAttestat ionClaims : := SEQUENCE {
codeHash [ 0 ] OCTET STRING,
currentStateHash [ 1 ] OCTET STRING,
cha l l enge [ 2 ] OCTET STRING,
log [ 3 ] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
timestamp [ 4 ] GeneralizedTime }
Listing 5.5: Agent Attestation Evidence ASN.1 structure data types
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Figure 5.2: Trust chain employed in the migration process. The Trust chain includes
the parties generating the attestation evidence and the attestation reference as well
as the appraiser validating the attestation. The dashed boxes in the Figure represent
the optional elements in the attestation.
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For all the attestation evidence, a PKI-like trust chain is assumed for their ver-
ification, as shown in figure 5.2. Each secure enclave will carry all the required
certificates to bind through the trust chain the AttestationEvidence to the OEM-
specific Migration rootCA. The trust chain for the attestation verification is built
through X.509 certificates and it may need cross-signed certificates from the TCB
Trust Root and the Migration SubCA to achieve compatibility between the secure
enclave and the specific TCB. As a result, the Migration SubCA is required to sign
four categories of records employed in the attestation procedure:
1. The X.509 certificate containing the public key of the enclave run-
time. This will be leveraged to sign the X.509 certificate of the endpoint
ephemeral authentication public key used in the trusted channel protocol. As
a consequence, also the AttestationEvidence will be signed by the secure en-
clave because it is included as an extension in the certificate of the TSL session
key.
2. The cross-certified TCB Trust Root, which is employed in the TCB at-
testation procedure. The Trust Root for each architecture may differ based
on the mechanism used to attest the trustworthiness of the TCB, and so, the
Trust Root needs to be signed by the Migration SubCA and vice versa. This
mutual signature is required by the relying party in the validation procedure
in order to trust the Trust Root.
3. The TCBAttestationReference. This contains a list of reference values
that are compared against the metrics of the TCBAttestationClaims and if
valid, they prove the trustworthiness of TCB.
4. The RuntimeAttestationReference. This includes the version of of the
runtime running on the attested platform and the hash reference for its state.
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5.2.3.1 Attestation validation
The endpoints participating in the trusted channel communication must always
perform the validation of the attestation. To successfully complete the validation
procedure, the secure enclave needs the evidence of the attested components and the
attestation references for the TCB and eventually the enclave runtime. As described
above, the evidence is generated by the attested endpoint and represents the state
of the platform and in case the state of the mobile agent. The references instead,
are generated by the Migration SubCA and represent known-good values for the
state of the platform. The references are signed by the Migration SubCA in order to
define the accepted states for the platform. And so, if the platform provides metrics
in the evidence that differ from the references, it means that the platform has been
compromised.
The validation of the attestation is accomplished in four steps. In the first one,
the signatures over the TCBAttestationClaims, and eventually the RuntimeAttes-
tationClaims and AgentAttestationClaims are verified to be valid. In the second
one, the challenge (included in the claims of each component) is compared against
the one provided by the TLS-Exporter for the current trusted channel handshake.
In the next step, the signature over the references received from the attested party
is verified in order to ensure also that it belongs to the Migration SubCA. Finally,
the metrics in the evidence are compared with the ones contained in the references
to make sure that they are matching. If an error occurs in any of the just described
steps the validation of the attestation fails and the establishment of the trusted
channel is aborted.
In addition to the attestation validation procedure, in the case the mobile agent
has to be received, before its resumption, its actual state should be verified. This
process can be performed by comparing the AgentAttestationClaims against the
mobile agent received in the application data of the trusted channel. If the hash of
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the received data matches with the claims in the AgentAttestationClaims, then the
mobile agent can be considered trusted and its resumption can take place.
5.2.4 Transmission
The transmission phase consists of the actual transfer of the data from the source to
the destination enclave. In this phase, the communication between the two secure
enclave instances is provided by the Trusted Sockets Layer library. Normally, a TLS
1.3 library employs a TCP socket to send the data over the network and establish
a secure channel with the other endpoint. However, in our prototype, this would
mean to implement into the secure enclave all the layers of the TCP/IP model from
the TSL down. That is because just in this way the secure enclave can communicate
directly over the network. On the other hand, this approach is not optimal, because
it would increase the code size of the secure enclave, and thus its attack surface.
To overcome this issue, a different strategy was adopted. Instead of including the
TCP/IP stack in the secure enclave, the TSL records are forwarded from the trusted
channel library to the host application. Thus, obtaining an architecture where the
TCP endpoint is in the host application and the TSL endpoint in the secure enclave
as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Therefore, the channel underlying the TSL connection
can be split into two distinct sections: (i) the communication channel internal to
the host device (Shared memory IO), and (ii) the external one connecting the two
TCP endpoints over the network (TCP/IP).
5.2.4.1 Shared memory IO Communication
The first section of the channel underlying the TSL protocol is the Shared memory
IO represented in Figure 5.3. This section is in charge of transferring messages be-
tween the secure enclave (TSL endpoint) and the host application (TCP endpoint).
Since the secure enclave is instantiated by the host application (more specifically its
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submodule "enclave driver"), at the time the instantiation occurs, the host applica-
tion reserves also the shared memory for the communication. The shared memory
can be written and read by both endpoints in our prototype. Enabling so, the trans-
fer of messages between the host application and the secure enclave. The message
exchange is based on a mechanism enforcing IO interrupts to synchronize the ac-
cess to the shared memory, and this is handled differently by the two components.
The transfer of information is always initiated by the secure enclave through an IO
interrupt that will be received by the host application. Every time an interrupt is
performed, the execution of the secure enclave will hold until a reply will be received
back. On the host application side instead, the channel is managed by handling the
IO interrupts coming from the secure enclave. These will take place every time the
secure enclave wants to exchange a message on the shared memory and will warn the
host application that a new request has been made. For instance, when the secure
enclave needs to receive a message, it employs a polling mechanism, that causes
multiple IO interrupts until a message or an error is returned.
5.2.4.2 TCP/IP Communication
The second half of the communication underlying the trusted channel protocol is
handled by the host migrator and is illustrated in Figure 5.3 as TCP/IP. Its role
consists in managing the messages exchanged with the TSL library and forward-
ing them to the destination device. The communication with the secure enclave
is administrated by the main process of the host migrator, meanwhile, the TCP
connection is handled by two additional threads. The first one handles the outgoing
messages, returning an error if the procedure was not successful, while the second
one handles the incoming messages. Here, when a message needs to be received,
the main process is polling the receiving thread for the message and then forwards
it to the TSL library. The reason underlying this design consists of having a TCP
5.3 MIGRATION FLOW 75
connection that is asynchronous with the rest of the application. And so, preventing
the host application from being blocked while waiting for a TCP message to arrive.
5.3 Migration flow
The TLS 1.3 protocol enables an efficient establishment of a secure channel between
entities over the network and it has been very well analyzed from its inception.
However, for a secure migration to take place, the guarantees of a secure channel
are not enough. Indeed, also the trustworthiness of the two endpoints participating
in the communication channel need to be assured. This can be accomplished through
the addition of mutual attestation and strong channel bindings as described in the
novel Trusted Sockets Layer protocol [18]. The TSL is based on TLS 1.3 and is fully
compliant with the specification: the extra guarantees can be implemented with the
callbacks offered by most of the TLS libraries. In fact, it was easily implemented
in our proprietary size-optimized TLS 1.3 library and in OpenSSL [18]. On these
grounds, the Trusted Sockets Layer has been considered as the optimal protocol to
use for the implementation of the secure migration between secure enclave instances.
The TSL library used in the PoC is the one based on our size-optimized TLS 1.3
library since the code size footprint is a decisive factor in our prototype.
The design process to integrate the TSL protocol into our project’s architecture
resulted in the migration scheme illustrated in Figure 5.3. The migration process is
always initiated by the host application on both instances, with a difference in the
type of migration requested. In the case the secure enclave contains a mobile agent,
the request is to start the migration as the Source enclave, meanwhile, when the
mobile agent is not present the migration is started as the Target enclave. Once
the request from the host application logic reaches respectively the enclave migrator
(on the source enclave) or the enclave harness (on the target), the modules initiate
the migration (see Figure 5.3). In the former case, the enclave migrator just invokes
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the Trusted Sockets Layer library to initiate the migration. Meanwhile, in the last
case, the enclave harness sets up a new secure enclave where the enclave migrator
immediately invokes the TSL library to establish the trusted channel.
As the TLS 1.3 protocol, TSL requires just 1.5 roundtrips to establish the trusted
channel and send the serialized mobile agent. The first half of the roundtrip, at
time 0-RTT, consists of just the ClientHello message, which differently from TLS
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Figure 5.3: Migration scheme designed for the secure migration of mobile agents
between secure enclave instances.
At time 0.5-RTT the target enclave performs all the operations required by the
TLS handshake plus some operations for the TSL protocol. Firstly, it includes in
the EncryptedExtesions the AttReqExtt (see Figure 5.3) in order to request the
source enclave attestation as well. Then it invokes the platform attester module in
order to obtain the evidences and the references (i.e. as described in the attesta-
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tion) that have to be encoded in the AttestationEvidence. Finally, it inserts the
AttestationEvidence in the X.509 certificate issued for the ephemeral TSL endpoint
authentication public key and signs it.
At the time 1-RTT on the source enclave side, in addition to the TLS operations,
the TSL library proceeds with the required operations for the mutual attestation.
As a first step, it validates the target’s TCBAttestationEvidence and eventually the
RuntimeAttestationEvidence against TCBAttestationReference and RuntimeAttes-
tationReference. Next it invokes the platform attester to get the platform attesta-
tions, performs the snapshotting phase, and invokes the agent attester for the agent
evidence. Once these operations are complete, all the evidences composing the At-
testationEvidence are encoded into the extension of the X.509 certificate, which will
be signed and issued for the ephemeral TSL endpoint authentication public key.
After the source enclave sends the client_Finished message, the trusted channel is
established and the serialization and transmission phases of the mobile agent can
take place.
At time 1.5-RTT the target enclave receives and validates the certificate of the
source enclave. And so, if the certificate and attestation are valid, the target accepts
also the mobile agent’s state and code and compares them against the AgentAttes-
tationEvidence to check their integrity. Next, the serialized data is forwarded to the
enclave migrator, where the deserialization and resumption phases are processed. At
this point, the target optionally sends back a confirmation that the agent was suc-
cessfully resumed, thus terminating the migration procedure and closing the trusted
channel.
6 Implementation
For the realization of the Proof-of-Concept (PoC) all three main modules, host
application, secure enclave, and enclave harness have been implemented.
Each module and submodule in the architecture of the secure enclave framework
was developed separately. The implementation of the components in the architecture
was split among the team members of this project. As a consequence, this thesis
will focus mostly on the modules that are the result of my personal contribution,
and so, on the modules directly involved in the migration scheme. For instance, the
exact implementation of the enclave harness will not be addressed, since its main
role is to support the hardware-assisted isolation of the secure enclave and I did not
contribute to its implementation.
In our PoC, Rust was the most favored and used programming language due to
its memory-safe code properties. Despite this, also the C programming language
was employed since also external libraries were used. In Figure 6.1 are shown the
technologies used for the development of the different modules in the architecture.
The green-colored components were implemented in Rust and the red ones in C. As
it is possible to note, two modules have both colors. That is because the modules
include or have to interface with code written in C, this will be later described for
the enclave runtime and enclave migrator respectively in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.2.3.
The mobile agent is the only yellow-colored component since it is the only one that
is compiled to WebAssembly. Finally, some components of the architecture are left









































Figure 6.1: Technologies used to implement the componets of the architecture em-
ployed in the PoC.
in gray as a mean to show either that they were not fully implemented yet (e.g.
the agent and platform attester) or that other technologies were used to achieve
low-level hardware compatibility (e.g. enclave harness).
The next sections will follow the same outline as the Chapter 4 in order to explain
more in detail the module’s implementation or just to give some insights on how it
was developed.
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6.1 Host application
6.1.1 Host application logic
Given that the host application logic is intended to be developed by the end-user
of the framework, for the completeness of the PoC a small demo program was de-
veloped. The component is written in Rust and its main duties are to (i) define
the target instance that will receive the migration of the secure enclave and (ii) col-
laborate with the enclave driver to load the mobile agent in the newly instantiated
secure enclave (i.e. execute a security-critical task into the SEE).
6.1.2 Enclave driver
The implementation of the enclave driver component is based on the Google Project
Oak [139]. The Oak project is aiming at creating a specification and a reference for
the secure transfer, storage, and processing of data. Furthermore, it provides the
tools to create on-demand secure enclaves on different hardware architectures. Oak
is a very vast project, providing many functionalities in the administration of secure
enclaves. However, the enclave driver in our project exploits just some of its func-
tionalities. Actually, Oak is exploited just for the instantiation of the secure enclaves
which consists in loading the enclave runtime and optionally the mobile agent. Even
though the Oak Project already provides some communication capabilities to the
secure enclaves, in our enclave driver the communication is implemented through a
shared memory between the host application logic and the enclave runtime. That is
because our project uses enclaves for a different purpose than Oak. Indeed, in the
Oak project, the secure enclaves are designed to offer some services over the net-
work. Meanwhile, in our project, they serve as SEE where the end-user’s programs
can run their (security-critical tasks as) mobile agents.
The design of this communication channel is described in the "Shared memory IO
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Communication" in Section 5.2.4.1. The channel was developed in Rust, and consists
mainly in managing the shared memory access and defining the IO interrupts used
by the host application and the secure enclave to communicate.
6.1.3 Host migrator
The host migrator, enclosed in the Host app of Figure 5.3, acts as an endpoint
for both, the TCP connection with the target instance and the shared memory IO
communication with the secure enclave. Both the endpoints within the module were
developed in the Rust programming language and their duties are spread over three
different threads:
• The main thread, which is handling the endpoint communication over the
shared memory and administrating the main logic of the component.
• The sender thread, a child thread, which is part of the TCP endpoint and
in charge of sending the messages over the TCP connection.
• The receiver thread, another child thread, which is part of the TCP endpoint
as well and is waiting for messages arriving over the network.
The role of the endpoint managing the internal communication over the shared
memory, mainly consists in processing the IO interrupts provoked by the secure
enclave. Each IO interrupt that is received by the enclave driver has a specific
identifier stating its origin and purpose. So, once the interrupt has been labeled
as related to the migration procedure, it is forwarded to the host migrator. The
last-mentioned module will handle the interrupt and will write back the response to
the shared memory. The IO interrupt can be categorized into (i) send request and
(ii) receive request. The first type is always related to sending messages over the
TCP connection. As such, it is immediately forwarded to the TCP sender thread.
The second type, based on the content of the request, can be either forwarded to
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the TCP receiver thread or handled by the main thread. In both cases, the secure
enclave is in a polling state and is asking either the TCP receiver for new messages
on the TCP channel or the host application for the moment the migration procedure
should start.
As aforementioned, the TCP endpoint is managed by two different threads. The
TCP sender thread is simply forwarding the message on the TCP connection and
replying with the result of the operation. The TCP receiver instead, is continuously
waiting for both, (i) either a message to arrive on the TCP connection or (ii) a
receive request from the secure enclave. In the former case, the thread just saves it
until also a receive request arrives. In the last case, it either replies with the TCP
messages arrived or by informing that nothing arrived.
The orchestration of all threads in the host migrator is performed by leveraging
the std::thread [140] Rust crate. Meanwhile, the communication between them is
fulfilled by the std::sync::mpsc [141] crate. The latter was extremely useful because
it provides the means to easily handle asynchronous channels between the threads
without any worry about concurrency. Finally, the last crate employed is the std::net
[142], which enables the communication of the two TCP threads over the network.
6.2 Secure enclave
The predominant programming language for the implementation of the secure en-
clave (mobile agent excluded) is Rust. However, given the various external projects
and libraries integrated into the architecture, the C language has a notable share of
code as well (see Figure 6.1). The majority of the C code is due to the FreeRTOS
kernel used as a base for the enclave runtime and to our size-optimized implemen-
tation of the TSL protocol.
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6.2.1 Mobile Agent
As specified in the Architecture (see Section 4.2.1), the mobile agent is the only com-
ponent that has code mobility properties and is compiled to WebAssembly bytecode.
For our Proof-of-Concept, the mobile agent is a key store with facilities for gener-
ating keys and using them for cryptographic operations. In particular, the agent
implements the XXTEA block cipher [143] in the C programming language providing
encryption and decryption operations to the end-user.
As a mean to check the successful migration of the mobile agent’s state and code,
the agent was trapped during the execution of the encryption and decryption pro-
cedures. And, after the resumption, it was verified that the encrypting/decryption
operations have been completed successfully.
6.2.2 Enclave runtime
The FreeRTOS-rust project [126] is employed to ease the integration of the FreeR-
TOS kernel together with the other components of the architecture. In its imple-
mentation, the most relevant aspect for us is the mechanism employed for the com-
munication between the different modules over the FreeRTOS kernel. For instance,
the WebAssembly Interpreter and the enclave migrator are executed on different
tasks of the kernel, and so, they need a way to communicate with each other. The
latter is implemented by leveraging the FreeRTOS Queues [144] for inter-task com-
munications. These are provided by the kernel and further wrapped [145] by the
FreeRTOS-rust project for the Rust programming language.
6.2.2.1 WebAssembly Interpreter
The PoC is employing our WASI prototype to create the execution environment for
the mobile agent (see Section 4.2.2.1). The WASMI interpreter is developed in Rust
and so it is the agent serializer, which is our extension to it. Their integration in the
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enclave runtime is in the form of a task in the FreeRTOS kernel, in order to execute
independently from the other components in the enclave runtime.
6.2.2.2 Agent serializer
The first features implemented by the extension are the snapshotting and the re-
sumption described in Section 5.2.1. Their implementation was straightforward
since the necessary data structures were already present in the internal state of the
WASMI interpreter. For the trapping mechanism, the function to call was defined
in the extension code as well. In fact, to make it callable from the mobile agent was
enough to declare it into the mobile agent’s source code.
The implementation of the serialization and deserialization phases instead was
more challenging. Indeed, even though the Serde framework [135] provides the means
to serialize the data structures, it was raising some issues. The cause was the smart
pointers1 employed by the Rust programming language. For instance, the main
issue with these was that when two pointers to the same register were undergoing the
serialization procedure, their deserialization was resulting in two pointers referencing
two different registers instead of the same one. This issue was arising because
the mobile agent’s state does not contain the addresses of the registers but their
values. This is needed because addresses on the target secure enclave will be different
from the ones in the source enclave. Thus, even though before the serialization
the pointers were referencing the same register, after the deserialization they were
pointing to different registers but with the same value. After several trials, the issue
was solved through the usage of a structure where the pointers and their value were
tracked in order to reconstruct them as they were before the serialization.
The size optimization within the serialization phase is provided by the compres-
sion crate in Rust. In particular, the BZip2Encoder [147] is used to compress the
1For more details on the smart pointer in Rust see [146]
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memory buffers in the mobile agent’s state (see Listing 5.1). The reason why only
these buffers are compressed is that they mostly contain zeroes in a simple mobile
agent implementation. Thus, they have a high compression rate compared to the
other data in the structure.
6.2.2.3 Enclave migrator
The enclave migrator is written in Rust and C code, and it is implemented as a
task in the FreeRTOS kernel. The main logic and the mechanisms allowing the
communication with both, the other tasks on the enclave runtime and the host
application were developed in Rust. Meanwhile, the administration of the TSL
library was written in C. To solve this discrepancy, the Rust’s Foreign Function
Interface (FFI) is used, which allows C code to be called from Rust and vice versa.
The communication with the WASI prototype is performed through the FreeR-
TOS Queues mechanism provided by FreeRTOS-rust. Meanwhile, the communica-
tion with the host application is handled through the shared memory IO communi-
cation described in Section 5.2.4.1.
The administration of the TSL library and the agent attester, although are writ-
ten in C, are planned to be reimplemented in Rust code as well. The TSL library
is directly called by the enclave migrator, which implements also the necessary call-
backs for the trusted channel. The callbacks, as described in the TSL protocol
contain the calls to the attestation and certificate generation procedures as well as
their validation.
6.2.2.4 Agent attester
For the PoC the agent attester was implemented just to provide the channel bindings
of the attestation to the Trusted Sockets Layer handshake. The channel bindings are
generated by calling the TLS-Exporter mechanism provided by the TSL library and
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are inserted into a sample of the ASN.1 structure illustrated in the Listing 5.2. From
the listing, only the challenge (channel bindings) is implemented at the moment and
the remaining evidence/claims are left for future work.
6.2.2.5 Trusted Sockets Layer library
The Trusted Sockets Layer library is a stand-alone implementation of the TLS 1.3
protocol. The library is developed in the C programming language and is code-size
optimized with just 20-63KByte of footprint. This makes it ideal to be used in the
enclave runtime, even if our architecture is not dependent on any specific library.
The only requirement is to provide the necessary callbacks in order to implement
the trusted channel protocol [18] and the IO callbacks for the transmission of the
TSL protocol messages.
The TLS 1.3 library offers a callback function interface for implementing the
transmission of TSL protocol messages. The default callbacks use the Unix socket
interface to send messages over TCP/IP. In our case, the library runs in a secure
enclave where there is no direct access to the TCP/IP stack. Therefore, the IO
callbacks are written on our own, in order to send and receive messages via the
shared memory channel between the host application and the secure enclave as
described in the shared memory IO communication in Section 5.2.4.1.
6.3 Enclave harness
The proof of concept was implemented on two different platforms, a device with a
x86 architecture and one with an ARM architecture. On both of them the enclave
harness is located at the hypervisor privilege level and use memory protection mech-
anisms. These consist in the Intel VTx [148] and ARM EL2 and second stage mem-
ory translation [149][150] virtualization technologies, provided by the x86 and ARM
architectures. On both architectures, the enclave harness is based on the Kernel-
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based Virtual Machine (KVM), which thanks to the just nominated virtualization
technologies, provides isolation of the enclave from the untrusted environment.
6.3.1 Platform attester
The secure boot binding, and so the platform attester was not implemented in the
PoC on the two devices and is left for future work. However, as described in the
paper by Pop et al. [19], the detailed design for its development is already in place
and the team is working towards its implementation.
7 Benchmarks & Analysis
The proof-of-concept described in Chapter 6 was subjected to functional and perfor-
mance testing (benchmarks). In this section, we report a series of benchmarks that
prove the efficiency of the migration process. The section will begin by reporting the
configuration of the benchmarks that have been run and a performance analysis on
the results. Subsequently, the chapter will continue with a discussion of the results
and security measures enforced in the migration process.
7.1 Benchmarks setup
Like the enclave harness, the PoC has also been implemented on two platforms.
The first one is a laptop with an Intel Core™i7-6600U 2.60GHz CPU and 16 GB of
RAM. The second is a Raspberry Pi 4 model B board with a Broadcom BCM2711
(ARMv8) 1.5GHz CPU and 4 GB of RAM. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
the isolation of the secure enclaves from the untrusted environments on the two
platforms is provided by the KVM running at the hypervisor privilege level. The
untrusted environment, where also the host application was deployed, is the Linux
OS on both devices. In particular, the Linux OS distributions were Ubuntu 20.04.2
LTS on the laptop and Debian 10 on the Raspberry Pi board. The benchmarks
were performed in mainly two configurations, (i) with the source and target secure
enclaves on different platforms and (ii) with the source and target secure enclaves
on the same platform. In the former case, both the secure enclaves and the host
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applications were on two different devices and linked through a LAN network. In
this configuration, the connectivity had a latency of around 0.35ms. In the second
one instead, the two secure enclaves were running on two different instances of the
KVM and the host applications were two separate processes connected through
the loopback addresses of the platform. In the latter configuration, the latency is
negligible and around 0.07ms.
The mobile agent used as a reference is the XXTEA cipher implementation
described in Section 6.2.1 and it was migrated while the encryption and decryption
procedures on the mobile agent were executing. The mobile agent’s state and code
size once serialized, was about 10.2 KB. This was the only information transferred
on the trusted channel as application data.
7.2 Benchmarks methodology & Results
The performance measures of the migration process in the PoC were carried out
using multiple timers in the source code of the implementation. For both the secure
enclave instances, multiple procedures were benchmarked, like the time employed
by the handshake, the serialization, the cryptographic operations, etc. Since the
measurements were computed on both enclave instances, some of the operations
have been benchmarked on just one or both instances. This behavior comes from
the fact that many measures include operations that are performed synchronously
on both instances i.e. the TSL handshake. Meanwhile, other ones like the seri-
alization, deserialization, and others occur entirely within the same secure enclave
instance. Comparing the times taken on both instances allowed us to verify that
the measurements of the various operations in the migration do not have significant
discrepancies. This is of great importance because the two enclaves are isolated
and so, the total time is obtained from the union of the unique measures on the
two instances (i.e. serialization and deserialization) plus the common measures (i.e.
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trusted channel protocol).
In the first configuration of the benchmarks, the main objective was to measure
the performance of the migration process in a realistic scenario. Therefore, the
source secure enclave was executed on the Raspberry Pi 4 board and the migration
of the mobile agent was towards the target secure enclave running on the laptop
device. This configuration may simulate, for example, the offloading mechanism
employed by mobile devices in the Mobile Cloud Computing, since the mobile agent
is moved to execute some operations on a more powerful device. The measurements
for this case were run 100 times in order to have statistically valuable benchmarks
and their results are presented in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.1.
The Figure 7.1 represents in a more intuitive way the findings in Table 7.1.
The bars in the figure represent the main workloads performed in the migration
procedure. Moreover, they are partially inclusive as a way to provide more details
on each operation performed. In the results, the time required for the attestation
procedure was not mentioned since the channel bindings require around 0.1ms, and
the attestation claims over the mobile agent, enclave runtime and TCB are not
computed. Meanwhile, The time spent over the TCP channel was not included
as well because due to the architecture of the PoC it was measured by the host
application, and so, asynchronously to the other measures. However, the overhead
imputable to the TCP connection can be neglected in our configuration since the
latency is about 0.35ms.
The objective of the second benchmark instead, was to measure the impact of
the security mechanisms on the total time required for the migration procedure.
Hence, the measurements of the migration procedure were performed several times,
and each time with a slightly modified mobile agent that was allocating increasing
amounts of memory. The increasing allocation of memory was simulating a bigger
mobile agent and so a higher amount of time required for the mobile agent to be
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of the average migration time for our mobile agent. The
bars are partially inclusive to provide more details on each operation performed.
relocated. In this configuration, the measurements for every mobile agent size were
run 100 times and on both platforms. The results are illustrated in Figure 7.2 and
are represented on a logarithmic scale for a better visualization for the reader.
The figure is able to show not only the performance discrepancy of the two
devices, but also the impact of heavy computational operations, such as the com-
pression algorithm used in the serialization procedure. Moreover, from the graph,
it is possible to perceive that the impact of the trusted channel handshake and its
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suboperations is significant compared to the total migration time until the mobile
agent size is about 63-92KB. After that point, the time required for the migration
is increasing proportionally to the size of the mobile agent.
Figure 7.2: Mobile Agent size vs. Migration time with logaritmic scale. The graph
compares the migration time required for mobile agents with different sizes on both
platforms with and without the compression in the serialization phase.
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7.3 Security analysis
The security requirements for the execution of the mobile agent are satisfied by the
Secure Execution Environment, the WebAssembly sandboxing, and the migration
scheme. In particular, the security requirements stated in Section 5.1.1 about the
migration of mobile agents are satisfied as per below:
• SR1 (Secure channel). Our migration scheme employes the Trusted Sock-
ets Layer library, which is an extension to a size-optimized TLS 1.3 library.
As such the TSL library follows the TLS 1.3 specification, thus fulfilling the
requirements of a secure channel. Furthermore, the endpoint of the TSL con-
nection is placed inside the secure enclave, and so also the execution of the
TSL endpoint (secrets included) is protected by attacks from the network and
untrusted environment.
• SR2 (endpoint trustworthiness). In our migration scheme the attestation
process includes the TCB, enclave runtime, and optionally the mobile agent.
If just one of these modules fails to be attested, the trusted channel cannot
be established. The trustworthiness is confirmed during the validation process
of the attestation. The attestation reference is provided along with the attes-
tation evidence in order to be used in the validation process. The references
are signed by a trusted third-party authority (i.e. an attestation CA) and
represent good values for the attestation evidence.
• SR3 (Channel binding). As specified in the Trusted Sockets Layer protocol
[18], the binding of the attestation to the trusted channel is performed by
including the challenge computed by the TLS-Exporter in the attestation.
The challenge is strongly bound to each trusted channel handshake since its
value is affected by handshake-specific values. In our migration scheme, the
challenge is included in the evidence of each attested component, in such a
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way that for each connection a new attestation must be provided. For the
same reason, relay attacks are not possible. Even if an attacker A is able to
extract an attestation from a valid endpoint P , the attestation will be valid
only in the specific TSL handshake between A and P , and cannot be reused
in another connection between A and the victim without detection.
• SR4 (Privacy). The privacy of the TSL endpoints is provided by both,
the trusted channel protocol and the SEE architecture. The trusted channel
protocol protects the identities and attestation evidence of TSL endpoints
against eavesdroppers from the network. Meanwhile the hardware-assisted
isolation protects them against attacks from the untrusted environment on
the local platform.
The privacy of the mobile agent is always protected on the local platform
since its execution is performed only inside the secure enclave. Moreover, the
mobile agent cannot be fooled to migrate on a compromised secure enclave
since before its replacement the target platform must be attested. Thus, a
compromised secure enclave will be able to provide just invalid attestations,
which will prevent the trusted channel to be established.
• SR5 (Forward security). TLS 1.3 does not allow re-using the same endpoint
authentication ephemeral key for multiple handshakes and the TSL protocol
does not allow resumption. Thus, each session has a unique key and handshake
that must include the mutual attestation of the endpoints. As such the only
long-term secret that an attacker may try to compromise is the enclave runtime
key but this is kept in the SEE and so it is protected against attackers from
the untrusted environment. If an attacker is able to compromise the runtime,
the attacker will not be able to receive or send mobile agents, since it cannot
provide a valid attestation. However, even if the runtime gets compromised,
the mobile agents sent in the past can be still considered legitimate, since at
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that time the attestations were valid and so the runtime was not compromised.
8 Conclusions
In this thesis, a design and implementation for migrating architecture-agnostic mo-
bile agents between secure execution environments (SEEs) was presented. The the-
sis work was part of a secure enclave framework project at Huawei Technologies
Oy Helsinki Research Center. The main problem addressed in this thesis was that
current SEEs are usually dependent on specific hardware architectures, which leads
to several limitations for the development of applications executing within SEEs.
That is because a new implementation is required for each architecture. In the
project and the thesis, a solution was developed where the above limitations had
been solved. The solution consists of running architecture-agnostic mobile agents
within hardware isolated secure enclaves that are implemented across different plat-
forms. My personal contributions to the project can be summarised as consisting
of two points. On one hand, I contributed by participating in the design process
of the migration scheme, by implementing the TSL library, by implementing the
communication channel between the secure enclave and the untrusted environment,
by taking part in the PoC implementation, and by performing the benchmarks. On
the other hand, the thesis itself contributes by providing a detailed description of
the problem, the migration architecture and the benchmarks results.
By definition, mobile agents are software programs able to move between multiple
devices. Our migration scheme empowers the mobility capabilities of mobile agents
between secure enclaves. In order to ensure that the security of the mobile agent
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is not compromised during its relocation, the migration scheme employs a trusted
channel protocol. The protocol makes use of mutual attestation and strong channel
binding as a means to guarantee the trustworthiness of the endpoints. In such a
way, the mobile agent can have reliable proof that the system, where it is relocating,
will ensure a high level of security for its execution.
The proof-of-concept of the secure migration scheme was implemented as part
of the project and the thesis work and demonstrates the relocation of a mobile
agent between secure enclaves on different platform architectures. The performance
analysis performed on the migration scheme reveals concrete measurements of the
time employed for the secure migration of mobile agents. Proper implementation
and measurements of the time required in the computation of the attestation claims
is not addressed in this thesis, but it could be part of a discussion to be addressed
in future work.
Finally, the PoC demonstrates that a live migration of mobile agents between
secure enclaves has a relatively low overhead, around 80ms per migration. Therefore,
it can be concluded that the presented architecture and implementation techniques
seem suitable for real applications such as the offloading techniques in Mobile Edge
Computing or the transfer of secrets between personal IoT and mobile devices.
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